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THE INEFFICIENCY OF QUASI-PER SE RULES: 
REGULATING INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN 
EU AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
 
Kenneth Khoo* and Jerrold Soh** 
  
It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal 
competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union 
and the United States; namely, Art 101 TFEU and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law 
concerning inter-firm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In 
this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime’s 
approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information 
exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU 
competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information 
exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand-alone” 
instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be 
grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as 
a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in 
antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the 
implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher 
error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of 
jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law 
more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for 
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Rapid technological innovation over the past few decades has led to an exponential 
increase in the ability of firms to store, transmit, and process information. Hilbert et al. 
estimate that from 1986 to 2007 the world’s capacity for bidirectional 
telecommunication has grown by almost twenty-eight percent per year. 1 In 
contemporary commerce, firms often rely on live, readily accessible data and 
information from other firms in making important business decisions.2 
For antitrust specialists, the exchange and use of information between 
horizontal competitors demands additional scrutiny, 3 as it is closely related to the 
competitive structure of the market in which these firms compete.4 The relationship is 
an involved one—information exchange has ostensibly conflicting effects on the level 
of competition in a given market.5 For example, while the existence of competitive 
markets is consistent with the free exchange of information between firms and 
consumers, it is also uncontroversial that the exchange of price-sensitive information 
may facilitate collusion between competing firms.6 This complex relationship mirrors 
 
1 Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate and 
Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 60, 63 (2011) (illustrating in a table how the compound annual 
growth rate of telecommunications has grown by twenty-eight percent a year). 
2 For example, institutional investors often rely on readily available information from financial data 
providers to determine their portfolio compositions. See Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock 
Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 20 (1969) (noting empirical evidence that investors 
act on the information implications of a stock split almost immediately after the announcement date, 
supporting the conclusion that stock prices adjust very rapidly to new information). 
3 In this paper, we will use the terms “competition law” and “antitrust” as equivalent synonyms for each 
other. However, when referring to the European Union we will preference the “competition law” term 
over “antitrust;” the reverse will hold true for the U.S. regime. See ALISON JONES & B.E. SUFRIN, EU 
COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2016) (noting that in general parlance 
competition law is often called by its American name, “antitrust law”). Our article also focuses on “stand-
alone” instances of information exchange. As will be explained, such initiatives should be distinguished 
from instances where the trier of fact uses information exchange (that may or may not come in the form 
of inter-firm communications) as an evidentiary tool to infer an agreement or concerted practice under 
either U.S. antitrust or EU competition law. We do not deny the validity of the latter. See infra Part II.E.1. 
4 See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 150 (2004) (emphasizing the role 
of information exchange in improving the observability of prices and quantities, and the sustainability of 
collusion). 
5 In this paper, we use the term “information exchange” as an equivalent synonym for “information 
sharing.” Both terms refer to bilateral or multilateral conduct, as opposed to facilitating practices that 
may comprise instances of unilateral behavior (such as unilateral invitations to collude). See ANDREW I. 
GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 396–97 (2002) (noting the distinction between unilateral practices that might facilitate 
coordination as opposed to practices that are adopted by agreement). A “facilitating practice” is “an 
activity that makes it easier for parties to coordinate price or other behavior in an anticompetitive way.” 
See PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1407B (2nd ed. 2003). A facilitating 
practice makes tacit collusion more likely to occur, and makes tacit collusion more effective. See id. 
Judge Posner first coined the term in Richard A. Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the 
Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1196–97 (1978). It has subsequently enjoyed 
extensive use by U.S. antitrust scholars, lawyers, and judges. 
6 See generally Matthew Bennett & Philip Collins, The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 311, 315, 320 (2010) (“Well-informed and confident 
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the approach that both the European Union (EU) and United States (U.S.) antitrust 
regimes have adopted. While many forms of information exchange between 
competitors are pro-competitive and unlikely to infringe antitrust law, other types of 
information exchange will raise competition concerns and may amount to violation of 
the law.7 However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law 
concerning inter-firm information exchange, the two regimes diverge substantially 
regarding the liability imposed upon firms for information exchanges. Firms face a far 
greater risk of liability for such exchanges under the EU competition regime as 
compared to its U.S. counterpart. Under the EU competition regime, many forms of 
information exchange are subject to a presumption of illegality, which may be difficult 
for the firm laboring under the presumption to rebut. 8 In contrast, under the U.S. 
antitrust regime, most forms of information exchange are subject to a “rule of reason” 
analysis that places the burden of establishing anti-competitive effects on the party 
alleging illegality.9 
This divergence should not come as a surprise. For many years, antitrust 
scholars have noted that relative to the U.S., EU competition law tends to err on the 
side of over-enforcement.10 A common reason given is that unlike U.S. antitrust law, 
EU competition law endorses a far more pluralistic approach in determining the 
legitimate objectives that it should pursue.11 One such objective is the concept of 
“ordoliberalism,” where competition is seen as an end in itself and not merely as a tool 
to achieve economic efficiency.12 For example, an ordoliberal regime would err on the 
side of preventing “Type II” errors as opposed to “Type I” errors13—conduct that 
 
consumers can play a key role in promoting vigorous competition between firms. . . . The primary way 
in which information sharing can harm consumers is if it has the effect of facilitating coordination. 
Specifically, it can play a role in allowing firms to engage in, and sustain, tacit or explicit coordinated 
behaviour.”). 
7 This is discussed in more detail later in infra Part I. 
8 Infra Part I.A.2. 
9 Infra Part I.A.1. 
10 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 45–46 (“The Commission and the EU Courts have been subjected to 
much criticism over the years for failing to take a sufficiently economically rigorous approach to the 
application of the provisions and for instead adopting a ‘form-based approach.’ This means prohibiting 
certain agreements or conduct as a matter of course because they are presumed to be anti-competitive, 
without examining their actual or likely effects in the particular case.”). 
11 Ioannis Lianos, Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law, in HANDBOOK 
ON EU COMPETITION LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 1, 32 (Ioannis Lianos & Damien Gerardin eds., 2013) 
(noting that the current state of case law of the European courts casts doubt on the appeal of the theory 
of a unitary objective and may indicate that EU competition law adheres to goals pluralism). 
12 Wernhard Möschel, Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View, in GERMAN NEO-LIBERALS AND 
THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY 142, 142 (Hans Willgerodt & Alan T. Peacock eds., 1989) 
(“[C]ompetition policy is primarily oriented to the goal of securing individual freedom of action, from 
which the goal of economic efficiency is merely derived.”). 
13 “Type I” errors (“false positives”) refer to the error costs following from wrongful convictions, while 
“Type II” errors refer to the costs following from wrongful acquittals. See Arndt Christiansen & 
Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs 
Rule Of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215, 216 (2006). 
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potentially harms the competitive process is prohibited even if such conduct can lead 
to positive welfare efficiencies.14 
Nevertheless, perhaps as a response to various problems associated with goal 
pluralism in competition law, 15  EU competition law has moved towards a monist 
regime focusing on economic welfare. In recent years, as part of a series of reforms 
which the European Commission (EC) terms the “modernization” of EU competition 
policy,16 the EC has promoted the view that EU competition policy should focus on 
enhancing economic efficiency, which it believes will promote consumer welfare. This 
effort to stray away from a pluralistic conception of competition policy to an efficiency-
based, U.S. style conception17 of the objectives of competition policy has resulted in 
significant convergence in antitrust enforcement across both sides of the Atlantic.18 
Given the aforementioned shift in goal prioritization, the normative case for continuing 
divergence in the regulation of information exchange across the two regimes is, at best, 
weak. 
In this article, we put forth arguments for why the U.S. antitrust regime’s 
approach toward information exchange is likely to be more economically efficient as 
compared to the relevant approach under the EU competition regime.19 Drawing on 
industrial economics literature, we use key economic theories of harm that concern 
inter-firm information exchange to elucidate a conceptual basis for the imposition of 
liability in relation to “stand-alone” instances of information exchange. We argue that 
 
14 See Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Comm’n, 1973 E.C.R. 215 (where the 
ECJ held that Art 102 was not only aimed at practices that may cause damage to consumers directly, but 
also those practices that may impact the functioning of an “effective competition structure”); Case C-
95/04 P, British Airways v Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I–2331 (where the court reiterated the same). 
15 See Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 
268 (2009) (noting that ordoliberal ideas are essentially inconsistent with the “consumer welfare” 
approach). 
16 The “modernization” of EU competition law refers to the major reform in the enforcement of EU 
competition law that accompanied the enactment of Regulation 1/2003 in 2004. These reforms attempt 
to bring EU competition law in line with modern economic thinking on efficiency and consumer welfare, 
and encompass changes in the interpretation and application of substantive competition law. The 
modernization reforms are also known as the “more economic” approach. See Philip Lowe, Director-
General, Directorate General for Competition, European Comm’n, Consumer Welfare and Efficiency — 
New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy? (Mar. 27, 2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_02_en.pdf. 
17 Modern day U.S. antitrust policy remains predominantly concerned with the enhancement of economic 
efficiency and welfare. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare 
Trumps Choice Symposium, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2012) (“The promotion of economic 
welfare as the lodestar of antitrust laws to the exclusion of social, political, and protectionist goals 
transformed the state of the law and restored intellectual coherence to a body of law Robert Bork had 
famously described as paradoxical. Indeed, there is now widespread agreement that this evolution toward 
welfare and away from noneconomic considerations has benefitted consumers and the economy more 
broadly.”). 
18 See BEN VAN ROMPUY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE SOLE CONCERN OF MODERN ANTITRUST POLICY? 
NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS WITHIN ARTICLE 101 TFEU 2 (2012) (“Times have changed. In 
recent years, the Commission promotes the view that EU antitrust policy should focus on enhancing 
economic efficiency, which it believes will promote consumer welfare. This new conception of the 
objectives of antitrust policy was developed in the US.”). 
19 See supra note 16. In line with the aforementioned convergence in goal prioritization across both the 
U.S. and EU competition regimes, we adopt economic efficiency as our normative yardstick. 
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such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule, which aims to 
prevent or reduce the probability of future economic collusion from arising.20 We 
characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation where liability may be imposed 
independently of any actual occurrence of economic harm. We also explain why it has 
no ex post counterpart in antitrust law.  
Given this characterization of the existing rules, we argue that as compared to 
its Sherman Act 21  counterpart, the enforcement of prophylactic rules through the 
statutory medium of Art 101 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) is particularly problematic.22 Article 101 TFEU and Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act have been read to encompass two distinct bases of liability23—the laws target both 
ex post collusion and the ex ante facilitation of such collusion.24 However, the relatively 
higher risk of Type I errors associated with ex ante regulation has not been internalized 
by the EU competition regime, with the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) 25  categorizing many information exchange practices as “object-type” 
infringements that are presumed to harm the competitive process without consideration 
of how information exchanges should be optimally regulated.26 We contend that the 
increase in error costs following from such formalistic rules is likely to outweigh any 
countervailing decrease in administrative costs. Compounding the problem is the 
likelihood of arbitrariness in any legal dichotomy separating information exchange 
practices into object-type infringements and “effect-type” infringements. We posit that 
these problems arise in EU competition law because of the bifurcated nature of Art 101 
TFEU, which results in a disjuncture between liability following a firm’s conduct and 
the economic effects flowing from that conduct.27  
To the best of our knowledge, our explanation of the problems associated with 
the implementation of ex ante regulation through bifurcated legislation is novel. 
 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
22 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May. 9, 2008, 2008 
O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits cartels and other agreements that 
could disrupt competition in the European Economic Area's internal market. It plays a similar role to 
section 1 of the Sherman Act in the United States. See Alison Jones, The Journey Toward an Effects-
Based Approach under Article 101 TFEU—The Case of Hardcore Restraints, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 783, 
785 (2010). 
23 Sherman Act, supra note 21, § 1. 
24 Both facilitating practices and explicit collusion are targeted by Art 101 TFEU and section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. See infra Part III. As for the distinction between ex post and ex ante measures in antitrust, 
see MOTTA, supra note 4, at 190, who distinguishes between interventions which target existing collusive 
practices (ex post measures) and interventions which help prevent collusive practices (ex ante measures). 
See also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 357 
(1984) and infra Part II. 
25 The CJEU comprises both the Court of Justice (ECJ), and the General Court (GC) (formerly known as 
the Court of First Instance (CFI)). In competition cases the ECJ hears appeals from the GC. See JONES 
& SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 97 (setting out the structure of the court). 
26 As we will explain later, “object-type” infringements in the EU competition regime are analogous to 
“per se” infringements in the U.S. antitrust regime. However, a defendant firm facing an allegation of an 
object-type infringement may be able to rebut the presumption of illegality with the requisite evidence. 
See infra Part III. 
27 See infra Part III.E. 
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Although issues with Art 101 TFEU have been canvassed in prior work,28 this article 
is the first to formally characterize the conceptual basis for these problems. Identifying 
why they arise puts us in a position to propose a targeted solution. Our examination of 
the rules regarding information exchange also has general implications for the use of 
economic reasoning in antitrust. While we support the extensive use of economics in 
contemporary antitrust as a methodological tool, our article highlights the limits of 
economic analysis in the face of interpretative constraints.29 Indeed, a central corollary 
of our paper is that a “rule of reason” type of analysis as pursued by the U.S. antitrust 
regime is normatively more desirable from an efficiency perspective for the regulation 
of facilitating practices in competition law.30 As the competition regimes in a majority 
of jurisdictions resemble EU competition laws more closely than U.S. antitrust laws, 
our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world. 31 
The article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the role of Art 101 TFEU and 
section 1 of the Sherman Act in regulating information exchange and discusses an 
important distinction between “economic” and “legal” collusion. It then distinguishes 
stand-alone instances of information exchange from instances where information 
exchange is used as an evidentiary medium to infer collusion. Part II characterizes the 
conceptual basis for imposing liability with regard to stand-alone instances of 
information exchange. It argues that such liability must be grounded on the conception 
of a prophylactic rule, and discusses several implications that follow from this 
characterization. In Part III, we provide an extended critique of the EU competition 
regime’s approach with regard to information exchange that follows from our 
observations in Parts I and II. Part IV concludes. 
 
28 See generally OKEOGHENE ODUDU, THE BOUNDARIES OF EC COMPETITION LAW (2006). 
29 By “interpretative constraints,” we refer to the notion that the CJEU is not free to disregard the wording 
of treaty provisions where it sees fit. See Gunnar Beck, The Macro Level: The Structural Impact of 
General International Law on EU Law: The Court of Justice of the EU and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 35 Y.B. EUR. L. 484, 490 (2016) (“Article 31 makes clear that the text must be the 
starting point of judicial interpretation and that the words in the text must be given their ordinary 
meaning.”). 
30 See infra Part III.A. 
31 Anu Bradford et al., The Global Dominance of European Competition Law over American Antitrust 
Law 20 (Jul. 2, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339626 (“[T]here has been a large increase in the 
proportion of laws that resemble the EU. In 1960, 0% of countries had language resembling the new EU 
competition law. But by 2010, 51% of countries had laws that resemble the EU. In contrast, 22% of 
countries had laws that resembled the US in 1960, but that number had dwindled to 10% in 2010.”). 
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I.  ANTITRUST AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
In this part, we set out the theoretical foundations for our subsequent analysis. We first 
explore two definitions of collusion in law and in economics, noting an important 
distinction between the two where tacit collusion is concerned. We go on to explain 
economic theories of harm behind instances of information exchange, drawing attention 
to their nature as facilitating practices. Finally, we argue that both the U.S. and EU 
competition regimes establish independent grounds on which liability for stand-alone 
instances of information exchange may be established. 
A.  The Legal Definition of Collusion 
Where exchanges of information between competitors amount to anti-competitive 
infringements in EU competition law or U.S. antitrust law, liability must be established 
under the respective provisions regulating horizontal relationships between firms, 
namely section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of the TFEU respectively.32  
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Section1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States.”33 The literal wording of the Sherman Act is, however, untenable insofar as 
“every” contract that restrains trade would be unlawful.34 As Justice Brandeis noted in 
Board of Trade v. United States,35 restraint is the very essence of every contract—read 
literally, section 1 would outlaw a substantial body of private contract law.36 The literal 
reading of the Sherman Act thus raises an intractable conundrum, since it is contract 
law that ensures the enforceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive 
markets to function effectively.37 
The U.S. courts have responded to the problems associated with such textualism 
by re-interpreting the statute’s broad mandate in line with the common law tradition. 




32 As we will discuss in Part II, the conceptual basis for the imposition of liability for (stand-alone) 
instances of information exchange is quite different from that of the imposition of the same for instances 
of explicit collusion. 
33 Sherman Act, supra note 21, § 1. 
34 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 102–03 (“A prohibition of ‘every’ agreement that restrained trade 
would encompass a full range of common, competitively insignificant or beneficial business 
arrangements, including most business partnerships and joint ventures, no matter how much they affect 
competition.”). 
35 Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
36 See also Nat’l Soc'y. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. U.S. (NPSE), 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).  
37 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 
541, 548 (2003) (“The creation of a contract law has become an important priority in many countries that 
have made a new (or renewed) commitment to markets, for there is a consensus that a good contract law 
is a necessary condition for a modern commercial economy.”). 
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Congress … did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the 
full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The 
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to 
give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law 
tradition. The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law 
precedents long antedating the Sherman Act, has served that purpose. It 
has been used to give the Act both flexibility and definition, and its 
central principle of antitrust analysis has remained constant. Contrary to 
its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any 
argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm 
of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint’s 
impact on competitive conditions.38 
 
The U.S. courts went on to develop two complementary categories of antitrust 
analysis. While not explicitly carved out by the wording of the Sherman Act, the “per 
se” category covers “agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly 
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their 
illegality.”39 In contrast, the “rule of reason” category is associated with “agreements 
whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the 
business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.”40 
For our purposes, the context in which information exchange is examined under 
the Sherman Act is important for two reasons. First, in United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co.,41 the Court held that information exchanges in and of themselves should 
not be subject to per se condemnation: 
 
The exchange of price data and other information among competitors 
does not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such practices 
can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and render 
markets more, rather than less, competitive. For this reason, we have 
held that such exchanges of information do not constitute a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act. A number of factors including most 
prominently the structure of the industry involved and the nature of the 
information exchanged are generally considered in divining the 
 
38 NPSE, 435 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added). 
39 Id. See also GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 181 (noting that if an agreement falls into a recognized per 
se category, liability is established once such an agreement is proved. In essence, anticompetitive effects 
are presumed and all defenses (i.e. attempts to demonstrate reasonableness) are precluded.). 
40 NPSE, 435 U.S. at 688. See also GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 284–85 (explaining that the rule of 
reason is a flexible rule that integrates “burden-shifting”—the plaintiff bears the initial burden of putting 
forth evidence tending to demonstrate anticompetitive effects (creating a presumption of liability), but 
that burden can be satisfied in a variety of ways. In turn, the defendant may have a burden to rebut that 
presumption of harm either by undermining the evidence that supports the presumption or by adducing 
evidence tending to show that the conduct will have no effects or will be procompetitive. The form in 
which such an inquiry is carried out depends on the circumstances of the case at hand.). See infra Part 
III. 
41 U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
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procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of this type of interseller 
communication.42 
 
The rule applies even when competitors agree to exchange information on future 
prices—while the agreement would likely amount to an antitrust violation, it is 
nevertheless not illegal per se and would be judged by a reasonableness standard.43 The 
second reason follows from the first. For an alleged violation of antitrust law that does 
not invoke per se illegality, the scope of evidence that the defendant is allowed to raise 
in rebutting the plaintiff’s case is very wide. Provided that the defendant’s rebuttal is 
directed at the issue of competitive effects, there are few, if any, limitations on the type 
of evidence that the defendant is allowed to adduce. 44  As we will explain in the 
following section, EU competition law departs from the aforementioned positions in 
U.S. antitrust law.  
2. Art 101(1) and Art 101(3) TFEU 
Unlike section 1 of the Sherman Act, Art 101 TFEU has a bifurcated structure, 
comprising two components dependent on each other.45 First, Art 101(1) TFEU prima 
facie prohibits “agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings, and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market.”46 Art 101(1) TFEU itself requires that an 
agreement or concerted practice must first be proven and thereafter shown to have some 
anti-competitive object or effect. 47  However, unlike the Sherman Act, substantive 
analysis of firm conduct under Art 101 is not limited to the objects or effects analysis 
 
42 Id. at 441 n.16 (citations omitted). 
43  OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, Information 
Exchanges Between Competitors Under Competition Law, DAF/COMP (2010)37, at 11 (Jul. 11, 2011) 
(prepared by Antonio Capobianco, OECD Secretariat) (noting that exchanges of information on future 
pricing intentions carry the greatest risk). 
44 However, U.S. courts have made clear that ruinous competition, like reasonable prices, would not 
constitute a cognizable defense. See U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Similarly, NPSE 
reaffirmed that defenses rooted in the premise that competition could lead to undesirable results (in the 
form of lower quality engineering services) were not cognizable. See NPSE, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
Beyond these limitations, however, the specific requirements of burden shifting remain unaddressed. 
Gavil et al. justify these exceptions on the basis that they did not tend to diminish the likelihood that the 
(net) anticompetitive effects would occur, but instead sought to excuse them. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 
5, at 253. Cf. the equivalent approach in the European Union where the defendant not only has to establish 
specific benefits under Art 101(3), but also has the burden of establishing other requirements like that of 
allocating consumers a fair share of the benefit, and the requirement that the agreement does not contain 
any indispensable restrictions. See infra Part III.C. 
45 Alison Jones & William E Kovacic, Identifying Anticompetitive Agreements in the United States and 
the European Union: Developing a Coherent Antitrust Analytical Framework, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 254, 
278 (2017) (“This structure means that the question of how restrictions of competition are identified at 
the Article 101(1) stage profoundly influences the role and scope of Article 101(3).”). 
46 TFEU, supra note 22, art. 101(1) (emphasis added). 
47 Numerous EU cases have established that the words “object or effect” are disjunctive conditions. See, 
e.g., Case C-56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 249; Case C-
234/89, Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, 1991 E.C.R. I–935, ¶ 13; Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-
384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services v Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. II–3141, ¶ 136.  
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in Art 101(1). The second stage of the analysis is found in Art 101(3) TFEU, which 
excludes from the scope of Art 101(1) any agreement that provides specific benefits, 
allows consumers a fair share of the benefit, does not contain any indispensable 
restrictions, and does not eliminate competition in a substantial part of the products in 
question.48 
The bifurcated structure of Art 101 has led to extensive debate regarding the 
appropriate role for each part. Jurists, competition authorities, and courts alike have 
struggled to find the right balance between the application of Art 101(1) and Art 
101(3).49 One major issue that arises from a literal reading of Art 101 is the ostensible 
requirement to conduct some kind of economic assessment when applying Art 101(1). 
Like section 1 of the Sherman Act, a presumption of illegality is drawn from conduct 
that “reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition law.” Such conduct is 
said to have its “object” the restriction of competition.50 This quasi-per-se rule has a 
rule of reason counterpart as well—conduct that does not fall under the “object” limb 
of Art 101(1) would be analyzed under the “effect” limb instead. However, applying a 
full-blown rule of reason approach to effect-type cases where anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects are balanced raises the obvious objection that Art101(3) would be 
rendered redundant.51 
A number of proposals have been made to reconcile Art 101(1) and Art 
101(3). 52  One approach is to adopt a broad interpretation of Art 101(1) that 
encapsulates many agreements within its scope.53 Under this approach, any detailed 
analysis of the anti-competitive and pro-competitive aspects of the agreement would be 
conducted under Art 101(3). Art 101(1) would thus serve a merely jurisdictional 
function; rigorous substantive assessment is completed under Art 101(3). A second 
approach is to conduct a more detailed analysis when determining whether an 
agreement restricts competition under Art 101(1), while limiting the scope of Art 101(3) 
to exempt agreements that are prima facie anti-competitive but nevertheless have 
demonstrable policy benefits. 54  A third approach associates categorical forms of 
efficiency with the two limbs.55 For example, Art 101(1) could be concerned with 
allocative efficiency related to deadweight losses arising from restrictions of output, 
while Art 101(3) could be limited to issues of productive and dynamic efficiency 
 
48 TFEU, supra note 22, art. 101(3). 
49 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 183 (“The bifurcated structure of Article 101 has, to some extent, 
complicated its interpretation and led to uncertainty as to the correct role for, and analysis required by, 
each part.”). 
50 See Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Comm’n (Cartes Bancaires), 2014 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62013CJ0067 ¶ 57 (“[T]he essential legal criterion for ascertaining whether coordination 
between undertakings involves such a restriction of competition ‘by object’ is the finding that such 
coordination reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition.”). 
51 GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 30 (2007) (“[A]n economic welfare interpretation of Article 
[101](1) would mean either that Article [101](3) is irrelevant (in which case the advocates of a rule of 
reason fail to offer a solution which is compatible with the legal text).”). 
52 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 183 (explaining the three major approaches to reconciling articles 
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independent of allocative efficiency concerns. 56  Indeed, this third approach is 
commonly invoked in merger regulation, where firms concede losses in static efficiency 
while arguing that productive and dynamic efficiency gains outweigh static 
inefficiencies from output reduction.57 
The appropriate reconciliation of these approaches is beyond the scope of this 
article. For our purposes, we only point out that all of them have problems.58 The first 
approach, for example, raises the specter of over-enforcement. Under Art 101(3), a 
defendant firm bears the burden of proof, not only of establishing the “specific benefits” 
under Art 101(3), but also other requirements such as allocating consumers a fair share 
of the benefit, and the requirement that the agreement does not contain any 
indispensable restrictions. 59  Given the significant difficulty of discharging one’s 
burden of proof under Art 101(3), some pro-competitive behavior will likely be 
wrongly condemned as anti-competitive under Art 101(1).60  
The treatment of information exchanges under the TFEU lies in stark contrast 
to the U.S. regime approach. Contemporary EU competition law prohibits certain 
instances of information exchange as object-type infringements, essentially regulating 
them pursuant to a quasi-per se rule.61 As we will discuss in Part IV, this departure has 
significant implications on economic efficiency. 
Despite the structural differences between section 1 of the Sherman Act and Art 
101 TFEU, both provisions aim to serve the similar function of differentiating between 
pro-competitive and anti-competitive concerted conduct.62 For decades, both the EU 
and U.S. courts have contended with the difficult substantive task of distinguishing 
between legal and illegal forms of concerted action.63 Nevertheless, it is now well 
 
56 Odudu first suggested this approach in THE BOUNDARIES OF EC COMPETITION LAW. See ODUDU, supra 
note 28. 
57 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 1163 (“[A]n [efficiency] defence would redeem a concentration 
which increases concentration and market power, but which results in significant cost savings and 
economies of scale”); Id. at 1166 (“Recital 29 of the EUMR now provides that it is possible that the 
efficiencies brought forth by the concentration counteract the effects on competition, and in particular 
the potential harm to consumers, that it might otherwise have . . . as a consequence, the concentration 
would not significantly impede effective competition.”). 
58 Jones and Sufrin note that neither the CJEU nor the EC’s interpretative framework equates to any of 
the three approaches outlined. However, the modern approach most closely resembles the third approach. 
Id. at 184. 
59 TFEU, supra note 22, art. 101(3). 
60 See infra Part III.C. 
61  See Case T-141/94, Thyssen Stahl v Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II–347; Case C-8/08, T-Mobile 
Netherlands BV v. Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I–4529; 
Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, Jan. 14, 2011, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1 [hereinafter Horizontal 
Guidelines]. 
62 Both section 1 of the Sherman Act and Art 101 TFEU target concerted action as opposed to unilateral 
conduct. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 279 (“§ 1 of the Sherman Act and Art 101 TFEU . . . attach 
special significance to conduct involving ‘concerted’ action. . . . § 1 of the Sherman Act imposes no 
liability on firms that act alone. . . . Single firm conduct is addressed instead under § 2. . . . Similarly, Art 
101 only applies to ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by undertakings and concerted 
practices,’ whereas Art 102 is directed at single-firm conduct.”). 
63  For example, commentators and courts have vigorously debated whether informal coordination 
between firms should amount to a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See GAVIL ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 280–81 (noting that the common nature of the effects of tacit and express collusion triggered 
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settled that both jurisdictions prohibit all forms of concerted action that amount to 
“collusive” conduct. 64  In general, it is known that explicit collusion between 
undertakings attracts liability in antitrust because of its adverse effects on economic 
efficiency.65 The inferential process here is instrumentalist—Art 101 TFEU and section 
1 of the Sherman Act aim to prohibit collusion as a form of anti-competitive conduct, 
but only because of its negative effects on economic welfare.66 
B.  The Economic Definition of Collusion  
Using antitrust as an instrumental tool to achieve economic welfare raises the difficult 
question of whether the reverse implication—that liability follows from a reduction in 
welfare—can be made. If liability is to turn on the welfare effects flowing from a given 
course of conduct, the definition of collusion could be expanded to encompass any state 
of affairs whereby certain conduct results in a decrease in welfare vis-à-vis a 
counterfactual where the conduct does not take place.67 While this does not reflect the 
current state of the law in both the European Union and United States,68 it seems to 
reflect the economist’s view of collusion —here, “economic collusion” refers to the 
situation where firms in a given industry have prices that are higher than some 
competitive benchmark.69 On the other hand, when legal scholars speak of collusion, it 
is often used as a synonym for concerted action, which implies some form of 
communication between the firms concerned.70 The economist’s definition is notably 
independent of this requirement. Importantly, “economic collusion” and “legal 
collusion” are distinct concepts, as each can exist without the presence of the other.71 
 
an extensive debate as to whether tacit coordination fell short of the law’s definition of an “agreement”). 
See also infra Part I.C. 
64 By “collusive” conduct, we mean that both section 1 of the Sherman Act and Art 101 TFEU prohibit 
explicit collusion that involves communication between firms inter se. For example, price-setting cartels 
would violate both section 1 of the Sherman Act and Art 101 TFEU. See U.S. v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 
645 (7th Cir. 2000); COMP/37.512 Vitamins [2003] OJ L6/1 ¶ 554.  
65 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that as prices increase, economic welfare decreases as the increase 
in profits made by the firms do not compensate for the associated reduction in consumer surplus). 
66 We do not deny that competition policy may advance pluralistic objectives. However, the advancement 
of economic (or more specifically, consumer) welfare remains the predominant objective advanced by 
both the EU and U.S. regimes. The influence of contemporary industrial economics on competition law 
and antitrust is particularly apposite here. See Akman, supra note 15, at 268 (noting that ordoliberal ideas 
are essentially inconsistent with the consumer welfare approach).  
67 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 18. 
68 See infra Part III.A.1 and 2. 
69 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 138. Note that where firms are competing in price, the competitive benchmark 
would be the equilibrium price of a game where firms meet only once in the marketplace, a situation 
where a collusive equilibrium would not be sustainable. In such a setting, any given firm will play a non-
cooperative action. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 527–
29 (2014). 
70 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 138. For now, it is sapient to treat the legal scholar’s definition of collusion 
as a synonym for a “economically collusive agreement or practice that should be outlawed.” Id. Thus, 
the legal scholar’s definition of collusion used here is a subset of the economist’s definition. 
71 For example, a state of tacit collusion amounts to “economic collusion” but not “legal collusion.” See 
infra Part I.C. On the other hand, an anti-competitive agreement that is not implemented may amount to 
legal collusion, but such conduct may not result in economic collusion. See JONATHAN FAULL & ALI 
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While a mere decrease in economic welfare does not entail antitrust liability, it 
is important to set out a theoretical framework concerning economic collusion insofar 
as antitrust attempts to respond to the adverse effects on economic efficiency that result 
from economic collusion.72 As we argue below, the differential treatment of distinct 
forms of economic collusion is critical to our argument that the rule prohibiting 
information exchange is prophylactic in nature.73 
Contemporary industrial economics informs the scope of competition law by 
highlighting the inherent instability of economic collusion even in the absence of laws 
forbidding anti-competitive practices. 74  Based on game-theoretic oligopoly theory, 
economists view market play between competitors as a game where competing firms 
are rational players in the market, attempting to maximize their profits. 75  An 
equilibrium of the game is defined as a state of affairs where each player plays its best 
strategy given what the other player plays, such that no player has an incentive to 
unilaterally deviate from his existing strategy. 76  For example, in the context of 
oligopolistic markets, each firm (player) may compete by deciding on the particular 
price it will adopt. Economists have shown that when price-setting firms interact with 
each other in a static (one-off) setting, each firm will choose to set the competitive price 
as its dominant strategy, even if few firms are in the market.77 Although both firms 
would be better off if every firm set the supra-competitive monopoly price, were this 
the case, each firm would have an incentive to deviate by instead setting a price below 
this supra-competitive price to capture the market shares of its competitors.78 Thus, 
every firm knows that any price it sets above the supra-competitive price would be 
undercut by its competitors. In equilibrium, every firm would therefore simply set 
prices at the competitive level.79 
However, when firms interact with each other repeatedly, they have an 
opportunity to retaliate, thereby punishing deviations (i.e., a reduction in price) by other 
firms in subsequent rounds.80 A simple example is the “grim trigger” strategy, where a 
firm commits to reducing its own prices to the competitive level in all subsequent games 
 
NIKPAY, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 206 (2014) (noting that under EU competition law, an agreement 
is reached even if one or more of the undertakings involved intends to ignore its provisions). 
72 See supra note 16. 
73 See infra Part I.E.1 and 2.  
74 See generally JEAN TIROLE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 239–74 (1988).  
75 The theory of collusive equilibria across repeated games was built across several seminal papers in 
game theory. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); John F. Nash, 
The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); James W. Friedman, A Non-cooperative 
Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1971); Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely 
Repeated Games with Discounting, 56 ECONOMETRICA 383 (1988). 
76 VARIAN, supra note 69, at 524–25. 
77 Id. at 527–29. 
78 Id. 
79 Although Varian considers competition in quantities, we consider competition in prices (i.e., Bertrand 
Competition). The game theoretic analysis remains invariant to the mode of competition considered. Id. 
at 512, 527–29.  
80 Id. at 531. 
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once any competitor has deviated.81 In other words, all future rounds would be played 
at the competitive-price equilibrium.82 A competitor considering whether to deviate in 
the present round would then have to consider whether the short-term profits from an 
individual price reduction in the present round would compensate for all the profits it 
foregoes in all future rounds.83 If the additional present profits earned from deviating 
do not outweigh the discounted present value of all foregone future profits, the 
prospective deviator will be reluctant to deviate, and supra-competitive prices will be 
maintained as a result.84 This coordinated maintenance of supra-competitive prices is 
the essence of economic collusion. An examination of the sustainability of economic 
collusion is thus based on the so-called “incentive compatibility constraint”—each firm 
compares the short-term profits it makes from a deviation with the profits it gives up in 
future when its rivals retaliate.85 A collusive equilibrium will only arise if the former is 
lower than the latter.86  
In light of the above analysis, to successfully collude, competing firms must 
overcome three obstacles. First, they have to reach a common understanding of the 
terms of coordination. Second, they should be able to monitor adherence to those terms 
of coordination.87 Third, they should be able to effectively punish firms that deviate 
from the terms of coordination.88 The first factor relates to the ability of competing 
firms to reach a collusive equilibrium, while the latter two factors relate to the ability 
of the competing firms to sustain that collusive equilibrium. The relationship between 
these factors and information exchange is an important concept that we will return to 
later in Part ID below. 
C:  The Posner-Turner Debate—Tacit Collusion and Conscious Parallelism 
Differing views over the scope of illegal collusion in competition law culminated in 
what is now known as the “Posner-Turner” debate in U.S. antitrust law.89 The debate 
centered on how competition law should treat the phenomenon of tacit collusion—when 
a collusive equilibrium arises without any form of communication between firms. 
Recall that in deciding whether to set a supra-competitive price at any point in time, 
each firm compares the short-term profits it makes from a deviation with the profits it 
gives up in the future when its rivals retaliate. Suppose that Firm A unilaterally 
increases its prices by five percent, and Firm B has to decide whether to follow its 
 
81 A “grim trigger” strategy describes the following strategy profile: “Cooperate in the first period and 
continue to cooperate so long as no player has ever defected. If any player has ever defected, then defect 
for the rest of the game.” FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 75, at 111. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 246. 
84 Id. 
85 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 160.  
86 Id. See also FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 75, at 246.  
87 In other words, they should be able to detect deviations from the terms of coordination. 
88 We adopt these distinctions from Angela O. González, Object Analysis in Information Exchange 
Among Competitors, 14 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 1, 23 (2012). 
89 See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 
1562 (1968); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).  
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3498616




pricing.90 Even without any form of communication between the two firms, a collusive 
equilibrium can still arise if Firm B decides to follow suit. This could be a logical 
commercial response if, for example, Firm B expects that a failure to do so would 
trigger a costly price war that would reduce its own profits, or if Firm B expects that it 
can increase its profits with the new (higher) industry price.91  
Two countervailing tensions informed the debate. On one hand, the influence 
of Robert Bork’s work on antitrust provided great deference to the instrumentalist role 
of competition law in promoting economic efficiency.92 Pursuant to this view, scholars 
like Posner and Kaplow have argued that antitrust law ought to respond to the 
inefficiencies resulting from tacit collusion. 93  On the other hand, legislators were 
reluctant to prohibit rational business conduct in the absence of evidence proving some 
type of explicit communication between two or more firms.94 The practical realities of 
antitrust law enforcement ultimately settled the debate in favor of the latter approach. 
The suggestion that behavioral remedies could be used to address rational responses to 
the structure of the market was viewed as a solution that was close to impossible to 
implement. 95  By mandating that firms behave irrationally to avoid infringing 
competition law, an antitrust authority would have to determine an appropriate 
competitive benchmark in each case—a herculean task given its lack of information 
concerning any given industry’s costs.96  
Both the EU and U.S. competition regimes endorsed the latter position that 
Turner advocated. In accordance with the proposition that tacit collusion alone would 
not be sufficient to establish liability, EU courts have required further extrinsic evidence 
of communication to establish an instance of illegal collusion. Following an instance of 
tacit collusion, a clear market outcome that is often observed is the phenomenon of 
price parallelism, where firms charge similar prices over time.97 However, the EU 
 
90 This example is similar to the one provided by Motta with regard to the sustainability of tacit collusion. 
See MOTTA, supra note 4, at 139–40. 
91 Id. 
92 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 2405 (“The economic revolution in antitrust that took hold in 
the Supreme Court in the late 1970s and the 1980s was brought on at least in part by Robert Bork's 
analysis of the original understanding of the Sherman Act.”). See also Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent 
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966). 
93 Posner, supra note 89, at 1575 (“The purpose of section I is to deter collusion by increasing its costs; 
this suggests that the tacit colluder should be punished like the express colluder. And tacit collusion is 
voluntary behavior, which should be deterrable by appropriate punishment.”); Louis Kaplow, An 
Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 448–49 (2011) (criticizing existing antitrust 
policy that relies on communication as a touchstone of liability). Cf. Turner, supra note 89, at 666 (noting 
that it would be unreasonable to interpret the Sherman Act to condemn rational and unavoidable 
unilateral behavior, even when the economic consequences mirrored that of conspiracy). 
94 Turner, supra note 89, at 666. 
95 See, for instance, Judge Posner’s about-turn in his review of Kaplow’s advocacy of his former views. 
Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 
767 (2014) (Judge Posner opined that he had no “confidence that punishing tacit colluders under antitrust 
law can produce net social benefits” because there is no “good answer” to the question of what courts 
should tell firms acting interdependently without communicating to do in order to avoid liability and 
exposure to damages.).  
96 Turner, supra note 89, at 665. 
97 VARIAN, supra note 69, at 531–32. However, parallel prices are entirely consistent with competitive 
behavior, and so additional evidence should be required to establish the existence of an agreement. 
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courts have restricted the inferences that the trier of fact may draw from such a market 
outcome. In particular, collusive activity may only be inferred from evidence of parallel 
conduct98 if it constitutes the sole plausible explanation for such conduct.99 In other 
words, where a finding of collusive activity rests exclusively on observed conduct, 
parallel conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of collusion where there is 
another plausible explanation. Such plausible explanations would, of course, include 
the argument that the parallel conduct was merely a market outcome resulting from the 
firms involved responding rationally to interdependent market movements.  
A clear illustration of this principle is provided in Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. 
Commission (“Wood Pulp II”).100 In this case, forty wood pulp producers and three of 
their trade associations were alleged to have infringed Art 101 (then Art 85) TFEU by 
colluding on price.101 Although there was explicit evidence that some of the firms 
belonged to two of the trade associations, the EC went beyond that and found that 
various firms not involved in the two trade associations had also infringed Art 101 
TFEU, an inference from their parallel conduct. In particular, the EC argued that the 
identical and quasi-simultaneous price announcements made by the firms amounted to 
parallel conduct that could be explained only by a concerted practice.102 On appeal, the 
CJEU annulled this portion of the EC’s decision. The CJEU accepted the expert reports 
the undertakings tendered that the “close succession of price announcements could be 
explained by the natural operation of the market.”103 
 
Kaplow, supra note 93, at 92 (“[I]t makes no sense to deem parallel pricing . . . as even indicative of 
oligopolistic price elevation since such activity is ubiquitous and, in particular, characterizes innocent 
competitive activity.”).  
98 It is important to note that evidence of parallel conduct encompasses parallel movements in any 
parameter of competition (such as output or product quality), not just prices. See Horizontal Guidelines, 
supra note 61, ¶ 27 (“[F]or an agreement to have restrictive effects on competition . . . it must have, or 
be likely to have, an appreciable adverse impact on at least one of the parameters of competition on the 
market, such as price, output, product quality, product variety or innovation.”). 
99 See Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85, 
Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Comm’n (Wood Pulp II), 1993 E.C.R. I–1307, ¶ 71 and Case 48/69, ICI v. 
Comm’n, 1972 E.C.R. 619, ¶ 65–68 (noting that where collusion is inferred from parallel conduct as the 
sole plausible explanation for such conduct, the inference of collusion is dependent on extrinsic facts 
beyond that of the parallel conduct). 
100 Wood Pulp II, 1993 E.C.R. I–1307. 
101 Id. ¶ 13–15. 
102 Id. ¶ 60–61. 
103 In an ordinary instance of tacit collusion, a given firm would respond to its rivals’ actions only upon 
its observation of those actions. This is a process that occurs over a period of time, and is closely related 
to the transparency of information within the market in question. See MOTTA, supra note 4, at 150 (Noting 
that the “detection of deviations is a crucial ingredient for [economic] collusion”). While the EC argued 
that the close succession of price announcements could be explained only by an illegal concerted practice, 
in Wood Pulp II the ECJ noted that the market for wood pulp had various market features which made it 
extensively transparent. 1993 E.C.R. I–1307. For instance, rapid information transfer amongst the wood 
pulp producers could be attributed to the fact that each buyer was in contact with several producers and 
would have an incentive to reveal prices set by other producers when they were reduced. Furthermore, 
most wood pulp producers also had downstream operations that purchased some of their input from 
upstream rivals, and thus would be immediately informed of any price changes by upstream rivals. 
Common agents who facilitated transactions between buyers and producers worked for numerous 
producers and expedited the process of price discovery. Hence, it was entirely plausible that tacit 
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Similarly, U.S. courts have been exceedingly reluctant to infer liability from 
evidence of tacit collusion, or conscious parallelism in and of itself. In Theatre 
Enterprises,104 the Supreme Court considered the conduct of several movie distributors 
who had collectively refused to allow an exhibitor access to first-run films for showing 
in a suburban theatre.105 The defendant distributors denied acting in concert and offered 
economic justifications as to why each of them had chosen to pursue an identical course 
of action.106 Importantly, the defendants alleged that each distributor would maximize 
profits by limiting access to its downtown theatres, as they offered “far greater 
opportunities for the widespread advertisement and exploitation of newly released 
features,” thought to be critical in maximizing the overall return from subsequent 
runs.107 In sustaining the jury’s verdict for the defendants, the Supreme Court noted 
that “circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy 
inroads into the traditional judicial attitude towards conspiracy, but ‘conscious 
parallelism’ has not read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.”108 Evidence 
beyond mere parallel conduct would be required to establish liability.109 
Baker suggests that the prevailing law on tacit collusion is best rationalized by 
the argument that an agreement is best understood as a process that involves negotiation 
and the exchange of assurances, in contrast to only an economic outcome.110 Thus, 
judicial definitions of agreements that are commonly used in contract law such as “a 
meeting of the minds” or a “conscious commitment to a common scheme” would be 
overinclusive, since they would encompass the conduct of consciously parallel 
interaction among oligopolists. 111  Indeed, it is easy to characterize any form of 
“follower-leader” behavior as a common understanding—the first price increase by a 
firm is an offer, and those that follow are acceptances.112 Each firm observes the others’ 
actions in determining the price it wishes to set. 
If mere tacit collusion does not amount to a violation of antitrust law, what is 
the appropriate touchstone of liability to establish illegal collusion? Our earlier 
discussion suggested a possible definition. Illegal collusion must contain some kind of 
active coordination between the two firms—an element of concerted action, which in 
turn implies that some form of communication between the firms concerned must 
 
collusion explained the behavior of the firms that were not involved in the two trade associations. Wood 
Pulp II, ¶ 102–05. 
104 Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). 
105 Id. at 538. 
106 Id. at 539–40. 
107 Id. at 540.  
108 Id. at 541. 
109 Id. See also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) 
(Justice Kennedy stated that “tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or 
conscious parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with 
respect to price and output decisions.”). 
110 Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 41, 47–51 (1996). 
111 Id. at 47 n.20. 
112 Id. at 41, 47. 
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exist.113 Indeed, in situations where antitrust authorities are attempting to establish the 
existence of an agreement, they tend to rely on evidence of documentation establishing 
the agreement between the firms, or on conduct that allows an agreement to be directly 
inferred from that conduct. 114  As the exchange of information between horizontal 
competitors necessarily entails communication between the firms, it is to the latter 
concept that we now turn.115 
D:  How Information Exchange Facilitates Collusion—Theories of Harm 
Consider a typical instance of a naked price-fixing agreement amongst several firms.116 
In order to sustain a collusive equilibrium in relation to a common price, the firms in 
question would have to first achieve unanimous consensus in selecting a particular price 
to set.117 Where explicit communications between firms take place, cartel price-setting 
usually proceeds by way of negotiation. Information exchange in this instance serves 
an enabling function, allowing the firms to agree on a price that would be potentially 
profitable for all of them.118 This is particularly important where firms in the industry 
have differing cost structures, as prices that are profitable for some firms may not be 
profitable for others.119 
 
113 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 189 (“[T]he legal approach which requests some hard evidence as proof of 
collusion is sensible practice. . . . [F]irms should be convicted for anti-competitive behavior only insofar 
as there is proof that they have communicated with each other to sustain collusion.”); Kaplow, supra 
note 93, at 448–49 (noting that contemporary antitrust policy relies on communication as a touchstone 
of liability). 
114 Such communication may extend beyond firms directly communicating to each other (e.g. through 
electronic mail or post) what market actions should be taken. Indirect or implied communications such 
as taking reciprocal actions may also suffice in signaling acceptance of and/or participation in the 
collusion. See VARIAN, supra note 69, at 531–32. For example, in Case C-277/87, Sandoz Prodotti 
Farmaceutici v. Comm’n 1990 E.C.R. I–45, the ECJ held that the tacit acceptance of a term that 
prohibited exports by a number of customers could be inferred from renewed orders placed without 
protest on the same terms.  
115 In this paper, we focus on bilateral or multilateral communications as encapsulated by the term 
“information exchange,” as opposed to communication that takes place pursuant to unilateral practices. 
See supra note 5. 
116  A naked price-fixing agreement is one that is not part of or ancillary to a legitimate business 
arrangement that is unrelated to the suppression of competition. See Joseph J. Simons, Fixing Price with 
Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with Competitor-Based Formula Pricing Clauses, 17 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 599, 599 (1989) (noting that “the distinguishing feature of naked price-fixing lies in the absence of 
any integration of operations; it is this absence that prevents this naked restraint from having any likely 
output-increasing or efficiency-enhancing qualities and is the reason for holding such restraints illegal 
per se.”). 
117 González, supra note 88, at 34 (noting that if firms are not capable of reaching a consensus regarding 
the optimal equilibrium and there is a lack of compromise on this aspect, the coordination scheme will 
probably not be adopted in the first place). See also Kai-Uwe Kühn, Carmen Matutes & Benny 
Moldovanu, Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between Firms, 16 ECON. POL’Y 169, 
181 (2001) (“[I]n games with multiple equilibria it cannot be assumed that in the absence of 
communication about planned conduct, players can figure out what the rival will play. How can one firm 
be sure that the other will play the ‘right’ equilibrium strategy or be sure that the other firm understands 
that it understands what should be played?”). 
118 Kühn et al., supra note 7, at 181.  
119 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 147 (noting that asymmetry amongst firms makes it harder to sustain a 
collusive equilibrium). See also Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak & Marshall Pease, The Byzantine 
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In the absence of communication, it is still possible for each firm to 
independently select an equilibrium price that would be considered by every other rival 
firm as being the optimal outcome from a collective point of view.120 This is indeed the 
situation where tacit collusion between firms is spontaneously formed—by definition, 
firms do not have to communicate to engage in tacit collusion. As the preceding section 
has shown, this would be perfectly legal under existing competition laws. Nevertheless, 
this is likely to be a relatively infrequent occurrence. Firms in real-world markets are 
prone to having heterogeneous cost structures, product lines, and expectations of future 
customer demand.121 As such, each firm is likely to select an equilibrium price that is 
optimal vis-à-vis its own unique circumstances, but sub-optimal in relation to the 
competing firms as a collective whole. Following this, a collusive equilibrium would 
be unsustainable—prices will eventually converge to the one-shot, non-cooperative 
equilibrium price.122 Any process attempted by such a firm to avoid this outcome might 
prove to be exceedingly costly. For example, if a firm were to increase its own price in 
an attempt to persuade its competitors to adopt a new collusive equilibrium price, it 
would lose market share in any adjustment period.123 On the other hand, if a firm were 
to decrease its own price to try to coordinate on a lower price, such a move might be 
understood as a deviation and trigger a price war.124 Such problems are avoided when 
firms engage in the exchange of relevant information.125 
As examined above, achieving a common consensus on a unique equilibrium is 
only one of the three main obstacles that firms must surmount to successfully collude. 
Even if firms are able to reach an initial agreement on a particular equilibrium price to 
be set, they will not be able to sustain the stability of the collusive equilibrium over 
time if they are not capable of detecting and punishing deviations.126 Consider a setting 
where a given firm cannot observe the prices charged by its rival firms. Where market 
demand levels are also unobservable, a firm would not know if the lower demand that 
it observes is attributable to a negative shock in demand or to a price reduction by a 
rival that has acquired some or all of its sales.127 In response, a firm would have to adopt 
 
Generals Problem, 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND SYSTEMS 382 (1982) 
(noting that the well-known multi-party coordination problem—that price fixing will be easier in 
industries where firms have similar cost structures—explains to some extent the concern of that antitrust 
authorities); MARC IVALDI ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE ECONOMICS OF TACIT COLLUSION FINAL 
REPORT FOR DG COMPETITION 4–5 (2003) (outlining these concerns). 
120 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 140 (noting that firms do not necessarily have to talk to each other for a 
collusive outcome to be sustainable). 
121 Id. at 141 (“If firms cannot communicate with each other, they can make mistakes, and select a price 
which is not jointly optimal for the firms, and might be difficult to change.”). 
122 VARIAN, supra note 69, at 530–31.  
123 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 141 (noting that if a firm believes the “right” price for the industry is higher 
and increases its own price to signal it, it will lose market share in the adjustment period). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 González, supra note 88, at 28. (“If firms are not capable of detecting and punishing deviations, they 
will be unable to maintain the internal stability of their collusive behavior which will then breakdown 
sooner rather than later.”). 
127 Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 
52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 91–92 (1984); MOTTA, supra note 4, at 150 (providing a stylized simplification 
of the demand uncertainty modeled by Green and Porter).  
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a strategy which probabilistically accounts for both possibilities. Green and Porter have 
shown that the optimal response to such falling prices involves a period of retaliation 
where the firm launches a price war for a limited amount of time before reverting to the 
collusive price.128 Should each firm behave in the same manner, its strategic response 
would invariably wrongly “penalize” rival firms, even in the instance where no firm 
has actually deviated from the collusive price.129 The collusion begins to unravel. Again, 
these costly strategies are averted when firms commit to sharing strategic information 
that increases the transparency of prices in the relevant market.130  
This discussion motivates two key theories of harm underlying information 
exchange.131 First, information exchanges may help firms reach mutual understanding 
and consensus of possible terms of collusion (the “formation” theory).132 As we have 
argued above, firms need not have explicit agreement on the specific prices or quantities 
in order to achieve a collusive equilibrium—information exchange on future prices or 
quantities may be sufficient to create such an equilibrium. Secondly, information 
exchanges may increase the internal stability of an already existing collusive 
equilibrium by making it easier for the participants to detect and punish deviations (the 
“internal stability” theory).133 A common thread here is that the harm to social welfare 
does not directly follow from the information exchange per se. Rather, the implicit 
assumption here is that the exchange facilitates the formation or maintenance of a 
collusive equilibrium, and it is that collusive equilibrium that is ultimately responsible 
for the economic harm.134 This observation has important implications, which will be 
discussed in Part II below. 
E: Information Exchanges as Facilitating Practices—“Stand-alone” 
Infringements of Art 101 TFEU and the Sherman Act 
Our analysis thus far has outlined the mechanism by which information exchange 
facilitates the formation and maintenance of a collusive equilibrium.135 We have also 
suggested that, notwithstanding its adverse effects on economic efficiency, both EU 
 
128 See generally Green & Porter, supra note 127. 
129 Id. at 93 (noting that despite the fact that firms know that low prices may reflect demand conditions 
rather than overproduction by competitors, it is rational for them to participate in reversionary episodes 
where they play the non-cooperative equilibrium price). 
130 González, supra note 88, at 29 (noting that targeted punishment contributes to the avoidance of costly 
and unnecessary price wars). 
131 See generally Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61, ¶ 62–63. 
132 Id. ¶ 62. 
133 Id. ¶ 63. Furthermore, information exchange may also increase a cartel’s external stability by allowing 
participants to share information and collectively target potential entrants (the “external stability” theory) 
through strategic behavior. Finally, and in a related vein, information exchanges may place non-
participants at such a significant competitive disadvantage that market entry is foreclosed (the 
“foreclosure” theory). This could occur, for example, in markets where data forms a critical factor input. 
Firms without access to the incumbents’ shared data exchange could face prohibitively higher costs of 
entry. We do not discuss these theories of harm in this paper as such exclusionary foreclosures of 
competition also attract liability under Art 102 TFEU. See id. ¶ 64–66. 
134 See infra Part II. 
135 See supra Part I.D. 
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and U.S. antitrust law permit tacit collusion for practical reasons.136 This leads us to a 
conceptual crossroads—what is the basis for imposing liability with regard to stand-
alone instances of information exchange? That is, when is barring information 
exchange appropriate in the absence of evidence that such exchange has actually 
facilitated explicit collusion? Does caselaw establish an independent, sui generis 
ground on which liability for information exchange may be established, or is this 
dependent on an inference of a separate anti-competitive agreement? 
1. The Evidentiary Role of Information Exchange in Establishing an Agreement  
Every instance of explicit collusion will necessarily involve inter-firm communication. 
Insofar as inter-firm communication takes the form of information exchange,137 one 
could posit that information-exchange merely serves an evidentiary function in proving 
the existence of explicit collusion.138 Extensive caselaw in both the European Union 
and United States supports such a proposition. Indeed, the U.S. antitrust regime has a 
long-standing tradition of inferring an agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act 
from instances of information exchange, especially in situations when evidence of inter-
firm communication is coupled with further evidence of price parallelism. 139  In 
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,140 members of a hardwood lumber 
mill trade association were alleged to have conspired to fix prices pursuant to an “Open 
Competition Plan” whereby member firms provided detailed information about their 
businesses. Each firm provided daily reports of all sales actually made, monthly 
production and inventory reports, and current price lists to the association.141 There was 
evidence that prices of hardwood lumber subsequently rose.142 The majority of the 
Supreme Court inferred an agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act on this basis, 
holding that the association had indeed “conspired to fix prices.”  
 
The “Plan” is, essentially, simply an expansion of the 
gentleman’s agreement of former days, skillfully devised to evade the 
law. To call it open competition because the meetings were nominally 
open to the public, or because some voluminous reports were 
transmitted to the Department of Justice, or because no specific 
agreement to restrict trade or fix prices is proved, cannot conceal the 
fact that the fundamental purpose of the “Plan” was to procure 
 
136 See supra Part I.C.  
137 As mentioned above, we focus on bilateral or multilateral communications as encapsulated by the 
term “information exchange,” as opposed to communication that takes place pursuant to unilateral 
practices. See supra Part I.D. 
138 In other words, practices involving information exchange may provide a basis for inferring an explicit 
agreement to fix prices. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 397. 
139 Gavil et al. note that many cases like American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 (1921) 
were primarily concerned with whether a price-fixing agreement could be inferred from instances of 
information exchange. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 414. 
140 257 U.S. 377 (1921). 
141 Id. at 391–97. 
142 Id. at 409. Cf. Maple Flooring Mfrs.’ Ass’n v U.S., 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (where there was no evidence 
that the information exchange raised prices). 
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“harmonious” individual action among a large number of naturally 
competing dealers with respect to the volume of production and prices, 
without having any specific agreement with respect to them . . . .143 
 
Where evidence of price parallelism exists, the evidentiary bar for inferring an 
agreement is even lower—the plaintiff need not prove the subject of the 
communication. 144  A fortiori, any evidence of communication that amounts to 
information exchange would be valid for the purposes of inferring an agreement. In 
United States v. Foley,145 for example, several defendant realtors were alleged to have 
conspired to fix real estate commissions in a given geographical area. The evidence 
established that the prevailing commission rate in that area was six percent of the sales 
price, but shortly after a meeting where the defendants had an opportunity to discuss 
prices each of the defendants substantially adopted a seven percent commission rate.146 
Furthermore, evidence was adduced to establish that some defendant realtors had made 
complaint calls where any failure to increase commission rates by other defendant 
realtors was questioned at length.147 While characterizing the defendants’ conduct as 
an instance of reciprocal information exchange would have been difficult, the Fourth 
Circuit nevertheless held that the jury’s inference of an agreement was valid.148  
The evidentiary role of information exchange in the European Union is more 
nuanced. The EC’s guidelines note that where information exchange takes place as part 
of another horizontal agreement or concerted practice, the competition assessment 
“should be carried out in the context of the assessment of the horizontal co-operation 
agreement itself.”149 Nevertheless, the CJEU has not been consistent in distinguishing 
whether the basis of liability for information exchange was due to the fact that the 
exchange facilitated a separate concerted practice or agreement to fix uniform prices, 
or whether the information sharing was prohibited as a concerted practice in its own 
right. In Suiker Unie v. Commission,150 several firms in the European sugar market had 
collectively entered into an arrangement in which exports were channeled into specific 
geographical markets and diverted from others. Other sugar dealers were also pressured 
 
143 American Column & Lumber, 257 U.S. at 410–11. 
144 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 360 (“Historically, the opportunity to communicate prior to an 
increase in industry prices . . . has been [an] important plus factor relied upon by the courts to infer an 
agreement on price in a parallel pricing case.”); Id. at 367 (“The mere fact of communication may support 
inferring an agreement without evidence of what was discussed, as may the opportunity to communicate 
without evidence that communication actually took place.”). 
145 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979). 
146 There was no direct evidence that the defendants had actually discussed prices at the meeting, beyond 
evidence that Foley announced that his firm was changing its commission rate from six percent to seven 
percent. Id. at 1332 (“Testimony as to what was said by various persons in the ensuing discussion is 
greatly in conflict, but there was evidence from which the jury could find that each of the individual 
defendants and a representative of each corporate defendant not represented by one of the individual 
defendants expressed an intention or gave the impression that his firm would adopt a similar change.”). 
147 Id. at 1333. 
148 Id. at 1334. 
149 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61, ¶ 56. 
150 Suiker Unie v. Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663. 
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to adopt this policy.151 Suiker was a case that involved market division—thus, the firms 
would have been subject to a quasi-per-se presumption so long as an agreement or 
concerted practice to divide the sugar market was established. 152  Naturally, the 
applicants disputed the existence of the concerted practice. It was in this context that 
the CJEU held that: 
 
The criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law 
of the court, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, 
must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions 
of the treaty relating to competition that each economic operator must 
determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the 
common market including the choice of the persons and undertakings 
to which he makes offers or sells.  
 
Although it is correct to say that this requirement of independence does 
not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves 
intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors, 
it does however strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between 
such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the 
conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose 
to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have 
decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.153 
 
On one view, Suiker illustrates that information exchanges in the form of “direct 
or indirect contact” between operators can be seen as independent concerted practices 
that may amount to anti-competitive infringements of Art 101 TFEU.154 On another 
view, Suiker merely stands for the proposition that information exchanges may serve 
an evidentiary function of proving that some other concerted practice exists, such as a 
concerted practice to fix prices and share markets as in Suiker.155 The fact that the 
arrangement was held to have as its object an anti-competitive purpose points towards 
the latter view.156 Under this view, the presumption of illegality arose from the fact that 
the concerted practice objected to was that of the market sharing arrangement (an 
object-type infringement) rather than the information exchange per se. In further 
 
151 Id. ¶ 127–130. 
152 The notion of “quasi-per-se” rules will be elaborated on in Part III.B. 
153 Suiker, 1975 E.C.R. ¶ 173–174 (emphasis added). The wording in these paragraphs have been cited 
in numerous subsequent cases involving information exchange. 
154 See infra Part II.E.2. 
155 That firms have the “right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of 
their competitors” mirrors the basis for why mere tacit collusion is not illegal—competition law should 
not require that firms behave “irrationally” to avoid an infringement. Suiker, 1975 E.C.R. ¶ 174. On the 
other hand, “direct or indirect” contact with competitors to influence their conduct or to disclose one’s 
own conduct is to be distinguished from tacit collusion (i.e. the former right). See generally infra Part 
I.C. 
156 It was not until more than thirty years later in Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van 
Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I–4529 that the CJEU established that 
a “stand-alone” instance of information exchange could amount to an object-type infringement of Art 
101(1) TFEU. 
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support of this view, the CJEU in Suiker held that “the object and effect of the said 
practices [in Suiker] which limit or control markets and also share markets within the 
meaning of Article 85(b) and (c) was to interfere with competition.”157 This reinforces 
the notion that the instances of information exchange were merely used to infer the 
existence of a separate concerted practice of market-sharing. 
2. Stand-alone Instances of Information Exchange  
Suppose that some competitor firms engage in information exchange, but that no 
evidence establishes a separate collusive agreement. Is such a practice prohibited by 
antitrust law? It is now well-established in both U.S. antitrust and EU competition law 
that these stand-alone instances of information exchange may be prohibited and 
enjoined by both the courts and antitrust authorities.  
In the United States, information exchange may be challenged as a stand-alone 
unreasonable restraint of trade under contemporary antitrust law. However, not until 
the late 1960s did the Supreme Court return to the issue of whether an information 
exchange could itself constitute a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In United 
States v. Container Corp. of America, 158 several defendant competitors periodically 
requested of each other verification of prices which they had most recently charged to 
a specific customer. 159  Importantly, the arrangement among the defendants was 
reciprocal—each defendant furnished the data with the expectation that its rivals would 
comply with requests for similar data when made.160 The Court held that the concerted 
action in Container was best understood as an agreement to exchange price 
information.161 As to whether the agreement had actually harmed competition, Justice 
Douglas held that “the exchange of price data tend[ed] toward price uniformity,”162 and 
hence concluded that “stabilizing prices as well as raising them [was] within the ban of 
[section 1 of the Sherman Act].”163 Justice Fortas concurred by noting that: 
 
The obvious effect was to “stabilize” prices by joint arrangement—at 
least to limit any price cuts to the minimum necessary to meet 
competition. In addition, there was evidence that, in some instances, 
during periods when various defendants ceased exchanging prices 
exceptionally sharp and vigorous price reductions resulted. 
 
157 Suiker, 1975 E.C.R. ¶ 195 (emphasis added). Reference may also be made to AG Mayras’ opinion in 
Suiker, 1975 E.C.R. at 2060 (Opinion of Advocate-General Mayras). There, the AG relied on ICI v 
Comm'n, 1972 E.C.R. ¶ 66 for the proposition that parallel conduct may “amount to strong evidence of 
[a concerted practice] if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal 
conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the 
undertakings, and the volume of the said market.” Note that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty is the 
predecessor of Art 101 TFEU. 
158 393 U.S. 333 (1969). 
159 Id. at 335.  
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 340. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 337. 
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On this record, taking into account the specially sensitive function of 
the price term in the antitrust equation, I cannot see that we would be 
justified in reaching any conclusion other than that defendants’ tacit 
agreement to exchange information about current prices to specific 
customers did in fact substantially limit the amount of price competition 
in the industry. That being so, there is no need to consider the possibility 
of a per se violation.164 
 
Justice Fortas’ concurrence was important in establishing that the defendants’ 
“tacit agreement to exchange information about current prices to specific customers” 
was in itself an antitrust violation insofar as it facilitated coordination on prices, 
ultimately limiting the amount of price competition in the industry.165 Critically, there 
was little evidence of price parallelism or price uniformity in the industry, thus 
defeating any argument that the agreement to exchange information about prices was 
used as a plus factor to infer a separate agreement to fix prices.166 
In the European Union, the doctrinal position has been clarified—it is now clear 
that an instance of information exchange may amount to an independent infringement 
of Art 101(1) TFEU. In Thyssen Stahl v Commission,167 several firms in the steel beams 
market explicitly agreed to continue fixing prices and sharing the market after a 
government-sanctioned quota system was abolished.168 As part of the arrangement, the 
firms also set up an information exchange to share commercially sensitive data.169 
Following Suiker, the court could have considered the information exchange purely as 
evidence of a concerted practice to fix prices. Instead, the information exchange was 
characterized as a stand-alone infringement on top of the price fixing and market 
sharing arrangements.170 This was a significant development for three reasons. First, 
the EC itself had sought to retract its assessment of the information exchange as a stand-
alone infringement. 171 However, the Court of First Instance (CFI), with which the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) later agreed, found that the EC was not entitled to 
 
164 Id. at 340. 
165 Id.  
166 “Plus factors” refer to economic outcomes and firm conduct that go beyond parallel conduct in the 
inference of explicitly coordinated action (as opposed to unilateral conduct). William E. Kovacic et al., 
Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 405 (2011). 
167 Case C-194/99, Thyssen Stahl v Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. I–10885 [hereinafter Thyssen, ECJ].  
168 Id. ¶ 3–7.  
169 The facts of this case are stated in more detail in the lower court decision. Case T-141/94, Thyssen 
Stahl v Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II–347 (Court of First Instance) [hereinafter Thyssen, CFI] ¶ 173–79 
(describing the various committees through which the firms involved continued to share confidential 
information even after the quota system was abolished). Recall that the CJEU comprises two separate 
court levels, first being the General Court (formerly known as the Court of First Instance), and an 
appellate court (the European Court of Justice). JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 97.  
170 Thyssen, CFI, ¶ 392 (“It must therefore be concluded that, in recitals 263 to 272 of the Decision, the 
information exchange systems in question were regarded as being separate infringements of Article 65(1) 
of the Treaty. In so far as they seek to alter this legal assessment, the arguments submitted by the 
Commission . . . at the hearing must therefore be rejected.”); Thyssen, ECJ, ¶ 77–90 (rejecting the firms’ 
argument that CFI erred in characterising the information exchange as a separate infringement). 
171 Thyssen, CFI, ¶ 384. 
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make such a retraction on appeal.172 Second, the CFI held, and the ECJ affirmed, that 
the information exchange was a concerted practice that “appreciably reduced the 
decision-making independence of the participating producers by substituting practical 
cooperation between them for the normal risks of competition.” 173  Third, the 
characterization of the information exchange as a stand-alone infringement was 
practically significant in this case because it increased the number of separate 
infringements for which the parties could be fined, thus increasing the parties’ total 
liability.174 
The opinion of Advocate General (AG) Stix-Hackl175 accompanying Thyssen176 
is particularly relevant because it distinguishes between the ancillary or evidentiary role 
of information exchanges in establishing other breaches of competition law and stand-
alone infringements of competition law. 
 
Information exchange systems will be anti-competitive in se if their 
anti-competitive nature results from the systems themselves, and thus 
independently of whether the information obtained through them was 
used for other “classic” breaches of competition, such as price-fixing 
agreements and market-sharing.177 
 
Further, AG Stix-Hackl noted that information exchanges leading to the 
removal of uncertainty between competitors should be distinguished from the 
restriction of decision-making independence among competitors.178 In her view, this 
distinction was important because establishing the former did not necessarily lead to 
the latter.  
 
In the case of an information exchange system constituting a separate 
infringement, the demerits of the act, according to the Court's case-law, 
lie in the fact that the risk of uncertainty intrinsic to free competition is 
partially or wholly removed. However, the demerits of “classic” 
 
172 Id. ¶ 77, 392; Thyssen, ECJ, ¶ 77–90 (rejecting the firms’ argument that CFI erred in characterising 
the information exchange as a separate infringement). 
173 Thyssen, CFI, ¶ 406, 410; Thyssen, ECJ, ¶ 89 (“[T]he Court of First Instance was entitled to hold, in 
paragraph 406 of that judgment, that the decision-making independence of the undertakings participating 
in those systems had been appreciably reduced.”). 
174 Thyssen, CFI, ¶ 385 (“This question [of whether the information exchange constituted a separate 
infringement] is important not only for the legal analysis of the conduct at issue but also for determining 
whether the imposition of a separate fine for that conduct was justified”). 
175 Case C-194/99 P, Thyssen Stahl v Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, 2003 E.C.R. 
I–10821. 
176  Advocate-Generals of the CJEU are formally appointed members of the court with “the same 
institutional status as judges.” See Albertina Albors-Llorens, Securing Trust in the Court of Justice of the 
EU: The Influence of the Advocates General, 509–528, 510 (2012) in CATHERINE BARNARD, MARKUS 
GEHRING, & IYIOLA SOLANKE (EDS.), THE CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 
VOLUME 14 (2011–2012). However, they do not perform a judicial function. Instead, their primary role 
is to assist the court by, inter alia, writing non-binding opinions on cases before the CJEU. See generally 
id.  
177 Id. ¶ 112. 
178 Id. ¶ 199–201. 
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infringements of competition, such as price fixing or market-sharing, lie 
in a separate disruption of free competition, namely the restriction 
placed on the decision-making independence of participating 
undertakings. Consequently, one can proceed on the premise that there 
has been a “consumption” of the demerits of the first action (removal of 
the risk attached to lack of knowledge) when the second action is 
committed (restriction of operational freedom) only if, in the particular 
case, nothing more remains of the demerits of the first action such as to 
justify a separate penalty.179 
 
In other words, instances of information exchange would amount to stand-alone 
infringements of Art 101 TFEU even if they were not parasitic upon any ancillary price-
fixing arrangement or other cartel facilitated by the exchange. According to AG Stix-
Hackl, this would arise where the “risk of uncertainty typical of competition . . . is 
reduced in such a way by [the information exchange such that] the restoration of free 
competition … appears scarcely conceivable.”180 
In the next part of our article, we argue that a stand-alone instance of 
information exchange is best grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. Further, 
we characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex 
post counterpart in antitrust law. 
II.  THE EX-ANTE REGULATION OF INFORMATION SHARING: A PROPHYLACTIC 
RULE 
In Part I.D. we posited that competition law attempts to respond to the adverse effects 
on economic efficiency that result from economic collusion. However, pursuant to the 
Posner-Turner debate, we have seen that an ex post remedy to economic collusion 
arising from tacit collusion is difficult to implement. 181  These difficulties are 
substantially attenuated from an ex ante point of view.182 As Sullivan, et al. point out: 
 
[O]ligopolistic interdependence, without collusion, [used in the legal 
sense, i.e. without communication] is not unlawful, even in instances 
where the effect is supracompetitive prices and returns… [However, i]n 
instances of interdependent pricing in which the oligopolists act 
concertedly to bring about or maintain the industry conditions which 
make interdependent pricing feasible, there is no inhibition to the 
application of Section 1. . . . When the concerted exchange of price 
information facilitates interdependent pricing, the concerted exchange 
is itself unlawful, not because it constitutes price fixing (which, in 
reason, it does not) but because, given the structural conditions of the 
market, it makes it possible or easier for the oligopolists to engage in 
interdependent pricing, conduct which is lawful if it occurs without 
 
179 Id. ¶ 200 (emphasis added). 
180 Id. ¶ 202. 
181 See supra Part I.C. 
182 Id. 
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concerted facilitation, but which is always harmful to competition… 
Precisely because interdependent pricing hurts competition, much as 
does cartelization, any concerted conduct by competitors that facilitates 
such pricing also hurts competition. And unlike interdependent pricing 
itself, such facilitating conduct is both avoidable by oligopolists and 
remediable by courts.183 
 
This is the crux of the rule that prohibits information exchange. Unlike the case 
of tacit collusion alone, information exchange involves an overt act on the part of firms 
that is not only avoidable by firms, but also practically remediable through the 
instrument of antitrust. The arguments that Turner raised earlier do not apply here—
unlike injunctive relief in response to tacit collusion that would involve courts in price-
regulation for which they are severely ill-equipped, injunctive relief here would target 
a specific species of conduct that firms would be able to consciously avoid.184  
At the same time, the overt acts involved in information sharing may be 
distinguished from the acts involved in conventional cartels such as price fixing and 
market sharing, in that the latter (but not the former) relates to coordinating or setting 
market variables like price and quantity—variables that directly affect efficiency and 
welfare.185 In this light, it is sapient to note that information exchange is a member of 
a larger class of conduct forming what is collectively known as “facilitating practices.” 
A facilitating practice is an activity that makes it easier for parties to coordinate price 
or other behavior in an anti-competitive way. Importantly, facilitating practices make 
tacit collusion more likely, and make existing instances of tacit collusion more 
effective.186 
A rule prohibiting certain facilitating practices is prophylactic—it aims to 
prevent or reduce the probability of future economic collusion from arising.187 Even if 
the rule is infringed, economic collusion will not necessarily result or be ongoing. The 
infringement of the rule merely conveys the fact that the firms in question have engaged 
in a course of conduct that would provide them with strategic advantages if they were 
to choose to collude in the future. In the context of stand-alone instances of information 
 
183 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AAN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 255–56 (3d 
ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
184 Turner, supra note 89, at 669 (arguing that Congress did not intend the courts to act as price regulators 
for all businesses posessing substantial monopoly power. Turner also suggests that an injunction that 
prohibits defendants from “further conspiring to fix prices” would be hopelessly vague, and that 
compliance would demand “irrational behavior.”) 
185 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 18. 
186 Posner, supra note 5 (defining facilitating practices). 
187 Cf. Ghezzi and Maggiolino’s view that market parallelism “still forms the second building block of 
any concerted practice in the form of ‘firms’ planned use of the strategic data acquired through an 
exchange,” Federico Ghezzi & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Bridging EU Concerted Practices with U.S. 
Concerted Actions, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 647, 663 (2014) with the earlier view in the 1970s 
that market parallelism was once “the crucial element of the notion of concerted practices.” Id. at 649 In 
our view, market parallelism was never required as an element in establishing a concerted practice. In 
fact, it takes on an even more diminished role for facilitating practices due to the prophylactic nature of 
the rule. This further suggests that the “parallelism plus” rule (which entails the finding illegal behavior 
whenever price parallelism is accompanied by a facilitating practice) adopted by U.S antitrust law is 
difficult to justify since it is the facilitating practice that renders the firm culpable, and not the parallel 
behavior per se. Id. at 665. 
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exchange, the prophylactic nature of the rule is immediately apparent—an infringement 
here is independent of any ancillary price-fixing arrangement or other cartel facilitated 
by the said exchange. Furthermore, some cases have established that the failure to use 
information acquired from the exchange of price-sensitive information does not amount 
to a substantive defense,188 as it is the exchange of such information that is problematic 
in and of itself.189  
Our characterization of the rule as being prophylactic raises several preliminary 
points that will be considered in turn. First, unlike a rule prohibiting collusion where 
economic harm has to be either proven or presumed, a prophylactic rule prohibiting 
information exchange guards against the risk or potential for economic harm.190 Thus, 
the chain of causation with regard to economic harm under a prophylactic rule is likely 
to be far more remote as compared to the chain of causation under a rule where 
economic harm has to be proven. Consider the inferential process involved in 
establishing anti-competitive liability under a typical rule of reason case. If the plaintiff 
alleging liability is able to establish that the anti-competitive effects outweigh the pro-
competitive effects following the defendant’s conduct, he discharges his burden of 
proof and the firm is held liable under antitrust law. 191  The inferential process is 
explicit—evidence of anticompetitive harm is used directly to establish anti-
competitive harm. In contrast, under a prophylactic rule, the plaintiff alleging liability 
may only have to establish that the conduct has occurred.192 Unlike under a per se rule 
where the anti-competitive harm is inferred, however, a further inference is required to 
establish economic harm. As mentioned earlier, no actual economic harm is inferred 
from the fact that the conduct has occurred. Rather, the conduct merely increases the 
probability that economic harm could occur. It is this probabilistic inference that makes 
the chain of causation more remote under a prophylactic rule. Consequently, the 
increased remoteness of a prophylactic rule with regard to economic harm raises the 
frequency of false positives, where pro-competitive behavior is wrongly condemned as 
 
188 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 
P, Aalborg Portland AS v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. I–123, ¶ 85.  
189 Thus, we argue that market outcomes such as high prices in a given industry, or parallel conduct 
amongst firms in the industry that ostensibly evidence the existence of a collusive equilibrium, should 
have little to no probative value in establishing a facilitating practice. Instead, a facilitating practice 
should be inferred from proven conduct, evidenced by e-mail messages, memos, or other recorded 
evidence exhibiting the alleged communications. This is in line with the orthodox view in antitrust policy 
that communication between firms inter se remains the touchstone of liability when collusive conduct is 
a concern. See generally Kaplow, supra note 93; MOTTA, supra note 4. 
190 See Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty 121 LAW. Q. REV. 452 (2005) 
(applying a similar concept to the rules concerning fiduciary loyalty). 
191 This characterization of the rule of reason is a tad simplistic, as most antitrust cases are decided 
pursuant to a structured, burden-shifting framework that turns on the strength and weight of the evidence 
regarding the adverse effects of the alleged conduct. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 256. However, 
we argue that a burden-shifting framework provides the means to determine whether anti-competitive 
effects outweigh pro-competitive effects in a given case. Indeed, several cases suggest that this is the end 
goal. See, e.g., Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“Ultimately . . . the harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge whether 
the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable.”). 
192 See supra Part I.E.2 (where we note how stand-alone instances of information exchange may be 
prohibited under contemporary antitrust law). See also our later discussion concerning object-type 
infringements regarding information exchange under EU competition law. Infra Part III.C. 
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anti-competitive behavior. 193  As we will discuss in Part III, the presumption of 
illegality associated with the object limb in Art 101(1) worsens the problems associated 
with such false positives. 
Second, as opposed to ex post regulation against existing collusive activity, a 
prophylactic rule in this context is arguably a form of ex ante regulation that aims to 
deter future economic collusion. The ex ante nature of the rule is not immediately 
obvious. Contemporary competition law enforcement is generally seen to be ex post in 
nature, for it primarily establishes and punishes past infringements or infringements 
that have already begun.194 However, as Shavell points out, the crux of an ex ante rule 
lies in the fact that liability may be imposed independently of the actual occurrence of 
harm.195 This may be contrasted with the situation where liability is imposed ex post—
in such cases, liability is intrinsically tied to actual or inferred harm that has occurred.196  
Ex ante regulation in competition law is, of course, not limited to the prohibition 
of facilitating practices. The obvious example of ex ante antitrust enforcement is that 
of merger review—prospective mergers may be prohibited prior to any consolidation 
when such mergers are projected to lessen competition.197 Clearly, in merger review, 
no actual harm has yet occurred because the merger has not yet taken place. Instead, 
regulation here is driven by economic theory. There is a strong basis for believing that 
a reduction in the number of firms or a more symmetric distribution of assets among 
firms would result in higher prices and a reduced level of social welfare, while also 
facilitating tacit collusion.198 Any prohibition of such a prospective merger must thus 
proceed on this conceptual basis.  
It may be argued that per se rules in antitrust are prophylactic as well. This 
follows from how a per se presumption of illegality in antitrust is irrebuttable—a 
defendant cannot adduce evidence of her non-implementation to rebut a presumption 
of illegality once her participation in the price-fixing agreement has been established 
by the plaintiff.199 Thus, an agreement to fix prices is barred under a per se rule, 
 
193 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative: Allocating 
Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L. J. 305 (1987). 
194 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, WHITE PAPER ON MODERNISATION OF THE RULES IMPLEMENTING 
ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE EC TREATY (1999) (noting a substantial substitution of the notification 
system for agreements to an ex post control system. A purported aim of the shift is to reduce the burden 
of notifications and free resources that can be more profitably used in the analysis of more important 
antitrust cases.). 
195 Shavell, supra note 24, at 357 (noting that ex ante regulation modifies behavior in an immediate way 
through requirements that are imposed before, or at least independently of, the actual occurrence of harm). 
196 Id. 
197 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 192 (“Another ex ante instrument to prevent collusion from arising is given 
by merger control.”). 
198 Id. at 192. We would also note, for completeness, that a forthcoming merger may be prohibited on the 
basis that the merged entity would have a unilateral incentive to raise prices. See GAVIL ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 675 (“[O]nce merged, the merged firm could raise price without needing to coordinate with 
any other firms.”). 
199 See Justice Steven’s observations in Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) 
(“The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation 
even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some. Those claims of enhanced competition are so 
unlikely to prove significant in any particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in its 
general application.”). 
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regardless of whether actual economic harm results from the agreement or not. As 
Justice Steven noted in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn.: 
 
The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se 
restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or 
speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are 
justified by the State’s interest in protecting human life and property. 
Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No doubt 
many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more safely, 
even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen … Yet the laws may 
nonetheless be enforced against these skilled persons without proof that 
their conduct was actually harmful or dangerous. In part, the 
justification for these per se rules is rooted in administrative 
convenience. They are also supported, however, by the observation that 
every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some threat to the 
community… So it is with boycotts and price fixing. Every such 
horizontal arrangement among competitors poses some threat to the free 
market.200 
 
Nonetheless, per se rules are distinguishable from other prophylactic rules 
insofar as actual economic harm is always inferred from a defendant’s conduct in per 
se cases.201 When no economic harm actually occurs, the inference of economic harm 
is a mere legal fiction, but the inference is still made out nevertheless. Viewed in this 
light, antitrust law undertakes a policy reason in prohibiting rebuttals against this 
inference. It does so because the benefits of permitting such a defense are far 
outweighed by their administrative costs, in particular, because the defense will be 
difficult to verify and in any event, has a very low prior probability of being valid.202 
In contrast, under a prophylactic rule prohibiting facilitating practices, no actual 
economic harm is inferred. Rather, the conduct is prohibited for exogenous reasons 
independent of actual economic harm.203  
 
200 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (emphasis added).  
201 Id. at 433–34 (emphasis added). 
202 See Jonathan B. Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Restraints, 36 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 733, 740 n.29 (1991) (explaining why the Court in Trenton Potteries refused to entertain 
arguments that the rates they had agreed to were “reasonable”). See also Justice Marshall’s dissent in 
U.S. v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Per se rules … 
are justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and 
that significant administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus 
the administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must 
far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this 
degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.”). 
203 Such reasons would include, for example, the social benefits from the increased deterrence with regard 
to conduct that could (probabilistically) result in economic collusion. As Kaplow argues, a legal rule that 
promotes social welfare could very well have social costs that chill beneficial conduct. Nevertheless, it 
would still be justified if the rule’s “deterrence benefits” outweigh its “chilling costs.” See generally 
LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 231–32 (2013) (outlining the framework for 
optimal decision-making for horizontal restraints). In the instance at hand, a prophylactic rule prohibiting 
facilitating practices would be justified if its attendant benefits outweighed its costs. We discuss these 
tradeoffs extensively in Part III of our article. 
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To state that a facilitating practice like information exchange is subject to a rule 
of reason or effects-based analysis ostensibly raises a paradox. If a prophylactic rule 
prohibits conduct independent of actual harm, how then will a plaintiff be able to 
establish his case that the anti-competitive effects arising from the defendant’s conduct 
outweigh the pro-competitive effects following from the same? With regard to 
information exchange, the answer lies in the general rule that the plaintiff is only 
required to prove that the exchange is likely to result in adverse economic effects; she 
is not required to prove actual effects. Nevertheless, pursuant to the rule of reason, the 
analysis must take place in the context of the relevant market and its characteristics.204 
Indeed, the appropriate analysis is exceedingly similar to that of the merger regulation 
setting, where a counterfactual scenario without the presence of information exchange 
is compared to a scenario where the information exchange takes place. 205  
In the final part of our article, we posit how the implementation of such 
prophylactic rules under existing EU competition law lead to higher error costs. We 
argue that any countervailing reduction in regulatory costs are insignificant as 
compared to the higher error costs, leading to an inefficient state of affairs as compared 
to the U.S. antitrust regime. 
III.  A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY EU COMPETITION LAW 
In this section, we argue that the enforcement of the prophylactic rules against 
information exchange under Art 101’s bifurcated structure results in net inefficiencies, 
especially when juxtaposed against the rule of reason approach. We outline a formal 
economic framework for analyzing the costs of competition rules, before critiquing 
existing EU competition law pursuant to this yardstick. 
A.  The Optimal Differentiation of Competition Rules 
It is well-established in the law and economics literature that in crafting an optimal 
standard of proof, a social planner faces an inevitable trade-off between accuracy and 
certainty. 206  This tradeoff has been characterized as a tension between rules and 
standards.207 In general, flexible standards that require intensive and context-specific 
fact-finding inquiries promote accuracy at the cost of legal certainty. In contrast, 
 
204 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra Part III.E. 
206 Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA 
L. REV. 1207, 1256–57 (2008) (“Our discussion [on categorical analysis in antitrust law] fits within a 
broader framework of legal scholarship on the choice between rules and standards. As that literature 
suggests, the tradeoff is generally one between certainty and accuracy. If neither costs nor uncertainty 
were a problem, standards would always be preferable to rules in antitrust cases because they are more 
likely to achieve the right result. . . . But [standards are] also likely to be more costly than a system of 
simple rules.”) (footnotes omitted). 
207 See generally Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 13; Lemley & Leslie, supra note 206; Jones & 
Kovacic, supra note 45; Jan Broulík, Preventing Anticompetitive Conduct Directly and Indirectly: 
Accuracy Versus Predictability, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 115 (2018); Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal 
Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992 (2019) [hereinafter 
Kaplow, Design of Legal Rules]; Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: 
Antitrust, Title VII Disparate Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 
(2019) [hereinafter Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures]. 
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categorical, bright-line rules tend to increase error costs, but are easy to administer and 
provide legal certainty to parties.208 
To further appreciate the tradeoffs involved in structuring an optimal 
evidentiary regime, consider a hypothetical spectrum distributed across the intensity of 
fact finding under a given legal regime. Christiansen and Kerber explain that as the 
intensity of fact-finding pursuant to a more differentiated rule (e.g. under the rule of 
reason) is increased, the probability of both wrongful acquittals and wrongful 
convictions is reduced.209 However, this reduction of wrongful inferences comes at a 
cost—as compared to less differentiated rules, differentiation also increases the 
regulatory costs of enforcement.210 On the other hand, legal presumptions increase error 
costs but reduce regulatory costs. For example, a legal presumption in favor of 
competition authorities211 would increase the probability of wrongful acquittals, while 
a legal presumption that gives rise to de facto legality212 would increase the probability 
of wrongful convictions. 
Regulatory costs may be further categorized into two related but distinct subsets. 
The first subset relates to administrative costs—the practical resources that regulators, 
litigants, and courts expend on cases under adjudication.213 For example, administrative 
costs would include the set-up costs of competition rules, any litigation costs incurred 
by enforcement agencies and litigants, and general monitoring and compliance costs.214 
 
208 Lemley & Leslie, supra note 6, at 1263 (“Bright-line rules may be acceptable, despite their error costs, 
because they conserve judicial resources.”); Jones & Kovacic, supra note 45, at 258–59 (“Excessive 
reliance on bright-line rules (to condemn or to exculpate) can sacrifice economic benefits generated by 
practices which pose some competitive dangers but, in important circumstances, serve valuable ends, or 
render decision takers powerless to act against conduct which has the ability to harm competition. . . . At 
the same time, bright-line rules can serve important ends (particularly, the attainment of procedural 
economy) when the rules rest upon a sound understanding, from theory and experience, that the practice 
in question typically imposes harm (a rule to condemn) or normally has benign or procompetitive effects 
(a rule to exculpate).”). 
209 Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 13, at 224 (“Since additional assessment criteria through more 
differentiated rules can lead to a better identification of pro- and anti-competitive behavior, a higher 
degree of differentiation will usually imply a reduction of error costs.”). 
210 Id. (“The costs of ascertaining whether a certain business behavior, such as a merger, is allowed or 
prohibited can be assumed to rise with increasing degree of differentiation. Hence, the cost curve 
increases and at an increasing rate. . . .”). 
211 In other words, a presumption of illegality. Id. at 227 (“The opposite per se rule that prohibits [conduct] 
B in all cases can lead to large welfare losses due to type II error, because all procompetitive B are 
forbidden, but the welfare losses through type I error are nil.”). 
212 In other words, a presumption of legality. Id. (“A per se-rule that permits [conduct] B in all cases 
would imply that there are no welfare losses by type II error, but perhaps considerable costs due to type 
I error, since all anticompetitive B are allowed.”). 
213 Broulík makes this distinction implicitly. See Broulík, supra note 207, at 116–17 (“This article focuses 
on the role of accuracy and predictability in the prevention, reflecting on the under-appreciation of 
predictability in mainstream antitrust scholarship. Models of optimal antitrust rules, in addition, 
frequently take into account resources spent by adjudicators and businesses on actual cases. . . . As these 
costs are moreover immaterial for the argument advanced in this article, they will not be further 
considered.”) (footnotes omitted). 
214 Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 13, at 231–32 (“The following four kinds of costs of competition 
rules can be distinguished: 1. Set-up costs of rules. . . . 2. Information and assessment costs in competition 
cases. . . . 3. General monitoring and compliance costs. . . . 4. Costs through legal uncertainty.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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The second subset relates to predictability costs. These costs are incurred by firms in 
predicting whether their conduct would attract liability under the regime in question.215 
Given the inherent tension between accuracy and certainty, “optimal 
differentiation” entails a level of differentiation where the marginal decrease in error 
costs is just enough to offset the marginal increase in regulatory costs.216 It is important 
to note that because a zero cost regime is not possible, the optimal evidentiary regime 
adopts a level of differentiation that minimizes the sum of both Type I and Type II error 
costs as well as regulatory costs.217 
The differing treatment of facilitating practices across the EU and U.S. regimes 
may be analyzed pursuant to this framework. In the context of EU antitrust law, 
Christiansen and Kerber illustrate that it is not sufficient to justify a rule of reason 
approach over a per se approach merely by arguing that a certain category of business 
conduct has both positive and negative economic effects.218 Rather, the optimal level 
of differentiation depends, inter alia, on the regulatory costs of enforcing such a rule, 
the relative incidence of cases where such conduct has more positive than negative 
effects (or vice-versa), and the relative magnitude of the consequences following a 
wrongful conviction vis-à-vis similar consequences following a wrongful acquittal.219 
Indeed, legal presumptions in favor of competition authorities that focus on the form of 
the challenged conduct rather than on its actual effects in the market are not necessarily 
inefficient.220 Rather, it is overt formalism that gives rise to inefficiency—where the 
net increase in Type I or Type II error costs outweigh any countervailing reduction 
 
215 Broulík, supra note 207, at 124 (“Since effectiveness of deterrence is based on expectations of 
businesses about future adjudicative decisions, it hinges upon predictability.”). See also Jan Broulík, Two 
Contexts for Economics in Competition Law: Deterrence Effects and Competitive Effects (N.Y. Univ. 
Sch. Law, Working Paper No.18-16, 2018). 
216 See generally Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 13 at 228 (“[A]t the optimal degree of differentiation 
d*, the marginal regulation costs of additional differentiation equal the marginal reduction of the sum of 
the error costs.”). 
217 Id. at 223 (“[T]he optimal rule is characterized by the minimum of the sum of welfare losses through 
wrong decisions (error costs) and regulation costs.”) (citing Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the 
Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1985); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, 
Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 99 (1989)). 
218 Id. at 238 (arguing that, to justify replacing per se prohibition of resale price maintenance in favour 
of a rule of reason approach, “it is not sufficient to show that there are cases in which resale price 
maintenance can lead to positive welfare effects.” Instead, empirical consideration of the positive and 
negative welfare effects of resale price maintenance “over a range of cases is necessary.”). See also Denis 
Waelbroeck, Vertical Agreements: 4 Years of Liberalisation by Regulation n. 2790/99 after 40 Years of 
Legal (Block) Regulation, THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: WHOSE REGULATION, 
WHICH COMPETITION? 85 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 2006).  
219 Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 13, at 238 (“[T]he following questions have to be answered: 1. . . . 
[W]hat is the frequency distribution of welfare effects of resale price maintenance? 2. How large is the 
‘separation effectiveness’ of additional criteria that are used in a more differentiated rule, that is, to what 
extent can their application reduce error costs of type II (‘false negatives’) and to what extent does it lead 
to additional error costs of type I (‘false positives’)? . . . 3. How large are the dangers of distorted 
decisions by the additional scope for rent-seeking behavior? 4. What are the additional regulation costs, 
including all kinds of direct and indirect costs?”). 
220 In general, a formalistic approach tends to favor rigid rules over more flexible and context-specific 
standards that weigh competing interests.  
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enforcement costs.221 In the following sections, we will examine the EU competition 
law regime in accordance with the aforementioned framework. 
B. Object-Type Infringements in EU Competition Law 
A per se rule is undifferentiated—once the existence of the alleged conduct has been 
proven, an irrebuttable presumption of illegality operates to establish liability. In 
contrast, a full-blown analysis under the rule of reason would be considerably 
differentiated222—such an analysis would require a detailed examination of the nature 
of the alleged conduct, the context in which it took place, and the competitive effects 
flowing from that conduct.223 At first blush, the approach adopted by the TFEU is 
similar. Like the per se rule, a presumption of illegality is also drawn with respect to 
object-type infringements.224 In contrast, where the conduct is determined to fall under 
the effects limb of Art 101(1), the trier of fact is required to evaluate the competitive 
effects following the alleged conduct and the context in which it took place. As such, 
analysis under the effects limb of Art 101(1) appears similar to that of analysis under 
the rule of reason. 
However, the regimes are not identical. Recall the bifurcated nature of Art 101 
TFEU 225 —unlike the U.S. antitrust regime, any agreement, including object-type 
agreements, may benefit from a “net economic benefit” defense under Art 101(3).226 
Thus, insofar as a defendant firm has an opportunity to rebut the presumption placed 
against him under Art 101(1), the object limb of Art 101(1) is not a true per se rule.227 
Neither, too, should the effects limb be equated with the rule of reason: while 
 
221 In other words, inefficiency arises from overt formalism (i.e. suboptimal differentiation) when Type 
I error costs outweigh the reduced costs in applying bright-line rules together with the reduction in Type 
II error costs. See Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 13, at 228 (“[A]t the optimal degree of 
differentiation . . ., the marginal regulation costs of additional differentiation equal the marginal reduction 
of the sum of the error costs.”). 
222 Id. at 220–21 (“Instead of the dichotomy of per se rules on one hand and rule of reason on the other 
hand, we want to introduce the notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules. As one extreme 
case, no individual effects are relevant at all under a plain per se rule such as the per se prohibition of 
resale price maintenance. At the other extreme point of a full-scale rule of reason, a comprehensive 
analysis of all pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects must be conducted in every particular case.”). 
223 Lemley & Leslie, supra note 206, at 1214–15 (“[I]n rule of reason cases ‘the factfinder weighs all of 
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing 
an unreasonable restraint on competition.’ Under the rule of reason, courts take ‘into account a variety 
of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.’”) (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
224 See supra Part I.A.2 for details on the objects and effects limb analysis under the TFEU. 
225 Supra Part I.A.2 
226 See Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II–2969, ¶ 233; 
Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II–595, ¶ 85. 
227 Jones & Kovacic, supra note 45, at 289 (pointing out that the TFEU approach is conceptually different 
despite certain similarities. “Although in some cases the EU courts have gone out of their way to stress 
that that they do no conduct a US-style rule of reason, the appraisal conducted in each does involve some 
loose form of balancing or consideration of the agreements benefits raised by the defendant against harms 
at the Article 101(1) stage, the very analysis that the Commission states is reserved for Article 101(3).”) 
(footnote omitted).  
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countervailing benefits of an impugned agreement is admissible in weighting the rule 
of reason, Art 101(1) TFEU focuses solely on anti- and not pro-competitive effects.228 
Nevertheless, while it is theoretically possible for firms to discharge themselves 
of liability under Art 101(3) in objects cases, in practice it is difficult to bring 
agreements found anti-competitive by object within the ambit of Art 101(3).229 Jones 
and Sufrin have argued that categorizing agreements exemptible under Art 101(3) as 
object-type agreements would subvert the objectives underpinning Art 101 because it 
would “create a risk of infringement for technical reasons… and wrongly [condemn] 
pro-competitive agreements.”230 
We can therefore situate analysis under per se rules, the object limb, and the 
rule of reason on a spectrum of increasing differentiation.231 Indeed, the European 
Union’s treatment of certain information exchanges as object-type infringements232 
involves trading off higher error costs (mainly in relation to Type I errors) 233 for 
administrative and predictive economy. As we will argue in the following sections, this 
trade-off is suboptimal in the context of the EU competition regime. 
C:  Object-Type Infringements for Information Exchange – Error Costs 
Undifferentiated rules are particularly costly where the categorical distinctions 
supporting the application of these rules are improperly drawn or where the categorical 
distinctions are not clearly defined. As Lemley and Leslie explain, optimal categorical 
analysis in antitrust requires that the categories of prohibited conduct are properly 
defined pursuant to empirical evidence,234 and that any categorical analysis does not 
encroach into a standards analysis such that its clarity is lost.235 Where these criteria are 
 
228 See supra Part I.A.2. 
229 Alison Jones, Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object Under Article 101(1), 6 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 649, 669 (2011) (“[T]he difficulty . . . is that a strong presumption has been created that 
[object] restraints will not satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3), and the modernisation process may 
have made it more difficult for those seeking to rebut that presumption.”). 
230 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 209. 
231 Jones & Kovacic, supra note 45, at 256 (making the important point that “the difference between rules 
and standards is a matter of degree, and the line between them can be fine”). We do not take a stance on 
the relative position of an effects limb analysis vis-à-vis its other counterparts (analysis under the per se 
rule, the object limb, and the rule of reason) on a spectrum of increasing differentiation, although we 
would opine that it would be prima facie less differentiated than the rule of reason, as Art 101’s bifurcated 
structure necessarily constrains the scope of the court’s analysis. 
232 As compared to the U.S regime, which examines all information exchanges under the rule of reason. 
233 See infra Part III.B. 
234 See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 206, at 1366 (“Categories should reflect the wisdom of empirical 
evidence. . . . After courts have seen a particular type of restraint and have condemned it repeatedly under 
a rule of reason analysis, that category of restraint warrants per se condemnation because courts can 
‘predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it. . . .’”) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)). 
235 Id. at 1262–63 (“[W]hile categorical reasoning and per se rules are supposed to increase predictability 
and consistency, these benefits of categorical analysis have gone largely unrealized. Shifting categories 
that leave ill-defined categories in their wakes reduce the predictability and clarity of antitrust doctrine. . . . 
The error costs associated with the categorical approach in antitrust are not offset by administrative 
savings because, as we have shown, categorical analysis often requires more effort than an inquiry into 
the actual competitive effects of a challenged restraint. In short, the categorical approach entails both 
error costs and administrative costs—the worst of both worlds.”). Note that Lemley and Leslie also 
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not satisfied, inefficiency arises in two forms. In the former, inefficiency arises from an 
increase in error costs. In the latter, inefficiency arises from an increase in regulatory 
costs. We shall discuss both of these inefficiencies in turn. 
Can a categorical approach to reviewing instances of information exchange be 
sustained in accordance with the prevailing empirical evidence? Once the prophylactic 
nature of a rule prohibiting information exchange is considered, it is easy to see why 
this criterion is difficult to satisfy. Recall that the chain of causation with regard to 
economic harm under a prophylactic rule is likely to be more remote and thus more 
error-prone than the chain of causation under two alternative rules—(i) where actual 
economic harm has to be proven and (ii) where actual economic harm is inferred under 
a per se rule.236 Unlike the latter two rules,237 a probabilistic inference is sufficient to 
ground liability here—no actual economic harm is necessarily inferred from the 
primary fact that the conduct has occurred. Therefore, with information exchanges, 
there is a greater inherent risk that conduct that does not ultimately lead to actual 
economic harm is wrongly prohibited. Additionally, as we will explain later, it is well 
established that information exchanges have many pro-competitive effects, further 
increasing the risk of wrongful convictions. 
The ambivalent nature of information exchanges thus limits the accuracy of 
categorical rules targeted at regulating them. Hence, we are of the opinion that all 
exchanges of information should be evaluated under a rule of reason framework of 
analysis, as any conceptual attempt to draw a dichotomy between object- and effect-
type infringements in Art 101(1) is likely to be artificial and arbitrary. As the CJEU 
explained in Cartes Baincares, the inference of illegality under the object limb in Art 
101(1) is premised on how such agreements may “be considered so likely to have 
negative effects, in particular on the price, quantity or quality of the goods and services, 
that it may be considered redundant, for the purposes of applying Article 101(1) TFEU, 
to prove that they have actual effects on the market.”238 This is in line with a common 
consensus amongst economists that naked cartel activity harms competition and is 
unlikely to have any countervailing benefits.239 However, unlike hardcore restrictions 
of competition, it is not possible to generalize instances of information exchanges as 
being harmful to economic welfare while also lacking countervailing efficiencies. Thus, 
it cannot be said that information exchange would be, in the CJEU’s own words, “by 
their very nature” injurious to competition.240  
 
identify additional requirements that we leave aside for this article, such as the requirement that courts 
do not rely on categories when the plaintiff has direct evidence of anticompetitive effects. See id. at 1365. 
236 See supra Part II. 
237 To reiterate, under the rule where anti-competitive harm is inferred, the inference of economic harm 
is a legal fiction, but antitrust law undertakes good policy reasons for prohibiting rebuttals against this 
inference. See supra Part II. Here we essentially argue that there are no such good policy reasons for 
prohibiting rebuttals with regard to instances of information exchange. 
238 Cartes Bancaires, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0067 ¶ 51. 
239 See supra note 115 (explaining naked cartels). 
240 Cartes Bancaires, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0067 ¶ 50 (“[C]ertain types of coordination 
between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning 
of normal competition.”) (citations omitted). See also T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. I–4529 ¶ 29 
(“The distinction between ‘infringements by object’ and ‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact 
that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being 
injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.”) (citations omitted). 
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More importantly, where information exchanges are concerned, the 
independence241 of pro-competitive effects from anti-competitive effects has important 
implications for the existence of a general heuristic distinguishing inherently harmful 
instances of information exchange from more ambivalent ones.242 In particular, the 
relative costs and benefits of information exchanges need not be negatively 
correlated—higher anti-competitive costs do not necessarily entail lower pro-
competitive benefits (and vice-versa). Indeed, the very same information exchanges 
which ameliorate the sustainability of a collusive equilibrium may also enjoy a plethora 
of efficiency-enhancing benefits. 
Consider the EC’s categorization of exchanges of information regarding future 
strategic intentions of either price or quantity as restrictive of competition by object.243 
According to the EC, a key concern with such information exchanges is their ability to 
signal desired market outcomes without bearing the risk that such outcomes will not be 
followed by rivals.244 For example, a firm can signal its intention to shift the market 
equilibria to a higher price point by announcing its future intention to do so. If none of 
its rivals commit to the intention, it can simply reverse its pricing decision ex post. On 
the other hand, if the firm commits to the new price and its rivals do not follow its signal, 
the firm will lose profits until it is able to reverse this commitment. 
Nevertheless, such price announcements also give rise to important benefits in 
reducing consumer search costs that enhance the competitive process. For example, 
public announcements of pricing data allow consumers to compare different offers and 
to select firms with the best offers.245 Crucially, public price announcements have a 
commitment value—once prices are announced, customers can act in reliance on 
them.246 Thus, there is a cost to the firm in rescinding such a commitment. In light of 
this, it has been suggested that the EC is unlikely to treat public price announcements 
as infringements by object.247 In Wood Pulp II, for example, the CJEU held that price 
 
241 By “independence,” we are referring to the notion that the pro-competitive effects of information 
exchange may be uncorrelated with their anti-competitive effects. 
242 See infra Part III.D. 
243  Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61, ¶ 74 (“Information exchanges between competitors of 
individualised data regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be considered a 
restriction of competition by object.”) (footnotes omitted). 
244 Id. ¶ 73 (“Exchanging information on companies’ individualised intentions concerning future conduct 
regarding prices or quantities is particularly likely to lead to a collusive outcome. Informing each other 
about such intentions may allow competitors to arrive at a common higher price level without incurring 
the risk of losing market share or triggering a price war during the period of adjustment to new prices. 
Moreover, it is less likely that information exchanges concerning future intentions are made for pro-
competitive reasons than exchanges of actual data.”) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
245 E.g., Peter A. Diamond, A Model of Price Adjustment, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 156 (1971) (showing where 
the optimal response of firms is to charge a monopoly price to consumers facing search costs, despite the 
presence of price dispersion); Paul Klemperer, Switching Costs, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 125 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008) (showing where firms are able to 
maintain higher prices and earn higher profits in the presence of positive switching or search costs). 
246 In particular, customers may be able to subject the firm to contractual or tortious obligations under 
private law. If the firm rescinds the commitment, it may be in breach of these obligations. 
247  See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61, ¶ 92 (“In general, exchanges of genuinely public 
information are unlikely to constitute an infringement of Article 101.”) (footnote omitted). Cf. 
Commission Decision of 7.7.2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39850 Container 
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announcements do not in themselves constitute market behavior that lessens each firm’s 
uncertainty as to the future attitude of its competitors, since at the time it makes the 
announcement it cannot be sure of the future conduct of others.248  
While ostensibly attractive, this analysis is deeply problematic. First, while 
purportedly prohibiting the disclosure of future strategic intentions among firms, the 
crux of the injurious nature of such information exchanges lies in the firm’s inability to 
commit to a price. Despite this, the public disclosure of future strategic intentions need 
not involve any costly commitment to a price. For example, a firm might publicly 
announce a future price increase, but then revert to the current price if other firms do 
not follow suit with similar announcements. 249 Moreover, the same announcement 
could well be in the interests of consumers who might want to know in advance the 
prices they will have to pay. More generally, a public price announcement of future 
strategic intentions may have both pro and anti-competitive effects.  
Second, a given firm’s ability to commit to a price has little to do with the ability 
of the price signal250 to ameliorate the existence of a collusive equilibrium. A firm 
intending to communicate price changes to its customers may well commit to a price 
that is contractually binding on the firm. But the same could be said of a firm that is 
confident in its signal’s ability to shift the market to a collusive equilibrium, perhaps 
due to its status as a market leader.251 Consider a market leader playing a reversionary 
strategy in a repeated-game setting. Where the market leader commits to a given price 
level, it would indeed suffer short-term losses if the rest of the firms do not follow its 
lead. Following such an outcome, the market leader could revert to a non-cooperative 
strategy for an extended period of time to punish its rival firms. Such a threat, however, 
would induce these rivals to follow the market leader’s price setting in the first place. 
Indeed, the argument relating price-commitment to economic harm can be turned on its 
 
Shipping), C[2016] 4215 (raising concerns that an information exchange between shipping container 
providers involving public announcements of the amount and implementation date of intended price 
increases could be an anticompetitive concerted practice contrary to Art 101(1) TFEU notwithstanding 
its public nature, and noting that the parties had committed to discontinuing the practice without 
admitting liability.). 
248 Wood Pulp II, 1993 E.C.R. ¶ 63–64 (“[A] concerted practice refers to a form of coordination between 
undertakings which, without having been taken to the stage where an agreement properly so-called has 
been concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition practical cooperation between 
them. . . . In this case, . . . the price announcements made to users . . . does not lessen each undertaking's 
uncertainty as to the future attitude of its competitors. At the time when each undertaking engages in 
such behaviour, it cannot be sure of the future conduct of the others.”). 
249 MOTTA, supra note 4, at 174. 
250 The price signal here refers to the price announcement made by the firm. 
251 See generally Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, Co-ordination, Spillovers and Cheap Talk, 105 J. 
ECON. THEORY 450 (2002) (exploring the general case of coordination games with strategic 
complementarities and positive spillovers (where “each player would prefer that the other players choose 
higher actions”) and showing that in such settings, which includes the specific case of oligopolies 
attempting to coordinate higher prices, the ability for one player to credibly communicate an intention to 
play the higher action facilitates the higher equilibrium. This is essentially because the lead player who 
announces his intentions first will trade off the expected returns from the commitment value of its signal 
(as compared to a signal which will be discounted by rival firms as cheap talk) vis-à-vis the expected 
losses from the situation where its rivals do not increase prices after the leader has committed to a given 
price.).  
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head. Insofar as credibility plays an important role in sustaining tacit coordination,252 a 
firm’s ability to commit to a price may actually enhance the possibility of a collusive 
equilibrium. On the other hand, there is a strong possibility that non-binding and non-
verifiable information (“cheap talk”) may be discounted by firms.253 Such information 
could ultimately have no effect on inter-firm coordination.  
This is not to say that the exchange of cheap talk information does not give rise 
to antitrust concerns. A large volume of literature has been written on the positive role 
of cheap talk communication in achieving coordination amongst players in games with 
multiple equilibria.254 However, it would be preposterous to simply adopt a general 
proposition that information exchanges are inherently harmful to economic welfare 
given that an equilibrium where information is ignored always exists.255 
Similar arguments may be made in relation to the market characteristics and the 
characteristics of the information exchanged that influence the welfare effects of 
information exchanges. 256 For example, the existence of concentrated markets, the 
strategic significance of the information, the degree of information aggregation, the 
frequency of information exchange, and the public/private nature of the information 
shared are all relevant factors in determining whether a given instance of information 
exchange is anti-competitive or not. 257  As alluded to earlier, the imperative point 
regarding these factors, however, is the fact that different factors may pull in opposing 
directions.258 An information exchange that is made in public is less likely to have a 
restrictive effect on competition; but the relevant exchange may take place in a highly 
concentrated market with firms that have symmetric costs and frequent interactions 
with each other. Similarly, exchanges of information concerning input costs are less 
likely to be viewed as strategic, but such exchanges may be highly disaggregated and 
conducted in a private setting. Thus, it is quite impossible to determine specific 
instances of information exchange that would be “considered so likely to have negative 
effects … that it may be considered redundant… to prove that they have actual effects 
 
252 Id. 
253 See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 103 (1996) (demonstrating 
various situations, including where parties prefer different outcomes, where cheap talk will be 
disregarded and thus would not lead to any specific Nash equilibria, particularly efficient ones). 
254 The seminal article is Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry, 18 RAND J. ECON. 34 
(1987). For subsequent work see, e.g., Farrell & Rabin, supra note 253; Baliga & Morris, supra note 251; 
John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? An Experimental Comparison of 
Observation and Cheap Talk, 39 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 1 (2002); Matthias Sutter & Christina 
Strassmair, Communication, Cooperation and Collusion in Team Tournaments—An Experimental Study, 
66 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 506 (2009); Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Ilkka Leppänen, Cheap Talk and 
Cooperation in Stackelberg Games, 25 CENT. EUR. J. OPER. RES. 261 (2017). 
255 Farrell & Rabin, supra note 253, at 108 (“Such a ‘babbling’ equilibrium [where firms completely 
ignore cheap talk communication between firms inter se] always exists.”). 
256 An enormous amount of literature covers the different market and information characteristics that 
influence the welfare effects of bilateral communications. A detailed discussion of the literature is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For a general overview, see Bennett & Collins, supra note 6. 
257 Other relevant factors include the stability of supply and demand, cost symmetries, the frequency of 
firm interactions, and the existence of barriers to entry. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61, ¶ 83–
94 (identifying each of these factors as relevant to the competition assessment under Art 101(1) TFEU); 
FAULL & NIKPAY, supra note 71, at 995–1005 (providing further background on the same factors). 
258 See supra Part III.C. 
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on the market.” 259 Any attempt at such categorization is likely to be conceptually 
incoherent and arbitrary. 
D:  Object-Type Infringements for Information Exchange—Regulatory Costs 
As we mentioned earlier, categorical, bright-line rules increase error costs, but provide 
benefits through the provision of legal certainty to parties.260 However, the efficacy of 
this seems to be limited in the EU competition regime. Consider the controversy 
surrounding T-Mobile261 and the subsequent Bananas case.262 In the former, five Dutch 
mobile network operators held a meeting where they discussed the reduction of dealer 
remunerations for post-paid subscriptions.263 The parties also discussed confidential 
information, although it is unclear from the CJEU’s judgment what the precise content 
of the information was.264 After elaborating on its general approach in determining 
whether firm conduct would amount to a violation of object or effect, the CJEU 
proceeded to issue several troubling statements concerning such infringements in the 
context of information exchange. According to the CJEU: 
 
[A]n exchange of information which is capable of removing 
uncertainties between participants as regards the timing, extent and 
details of the modifications to be adopted by the undertaking concerned 
must be regarded as pursuing an anticompetitive object. . . .”265 
 
Somewhat ironically, the “capable of removing uncertainties” test has generated 
significant uncertainty with regard to the legal position. T-Mobile may be read to stand 
for two related propositions that differ in their scope. First, T-Mobile can be read to 
stand for the broad proposition that information exchanges may be considered quasi-
per se infringements in their own right, even if such exchanges are part of a wider cartel 
scheme. This is relatively uncontroversial.266 As Faull and Nikpay point out, a direct 
link between the concerted practice of information exchange and the outcome was not 
established in the case.267 Second, T-Mobile can be read narrowly for the proposition 
that any private information exchange designed to remove uncertainties concerning the 
intended conduct of the participating firms and thus facilitating the fixing of selling 
prices falls within the category of restraints that are restrictive by object. The risk of 
wrongfully condemning pro-competitive behavior is very large here, and not 
surprisingly, numerous commentators have criticized this particular legal test. Jones 
 
259 Cartes Bancaires, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0067 ¶ 51. 
260 Through the form of reducing predictability costs.  
261 T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. I–4529. 
262 Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co Inc v Comm’n, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0286 (Mar. 19, 
2015). 
263 T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. ¶ 10–12. 
264 Id. ¶ 12 (noting that confidential information was exchanged, but without specifying details). 
265 Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added). 
266 See the earlier discussion in Part I.D.2, particularly the discussion on Thyssen Stahl v Comm'n, 1999 
E.C.R. II-347. 
267 FAULL & NIKPAY, supra note 71, at 1046. 
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and Sufrin argue that the CJEU “went further than perhaps was required for the case,”268 
and that the statements in T-Mobile “extend the category of object restraints to an 
overtly broad and somewhat uncertain group of information-exchange agreements.”269 
Meyring notes the absurdity inherent in a literal reading of the test, 270  since any 
information exchange is certainly “capable of removing uncertainties” between 
participants, and thus argues that a narrow reading of T-Mobile is necessary in light of 
other developments in the case law.271 However, a constrained reading of the test raises 
the question of why the information exchange at hand was viewed as a separate 
infringement of competition law distinct from the underlying cartel scheme. In our view, 
it would be conceptually neater to view the information exchange as probative evidence 
in inferring the existence of a price-fixing cartel, rather than as a separate violation of 
the law. 
Subsequent CJEU decisions have not resolved this uncertainty. In Bananas,272 
several employees of firms active in the banana trade made bilateral calls to discuss 
information relating to the setting of quotation prices for coming weeks.273 Importantly, 
it was unclear whether actual market prices were influenced because the quotation 
prices were neither actual prices nor the basis for negotiation of the actual prices.274 
Moreover, the EC did not contest that the employees taking part in these discussions 
had no authority to set quotation prices.275 The firms in question thus attempted to argue 
that the pre-pricing communications did not remove uncertainty as to the setting of 
 
268 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 3, at 683. 
269 Id. But note that in contrast to our analysis, Jones and Sufrin do not provide reasons as to why the 
statements in T-Mobile are overly broad—they simply state the proposition as one that is self-evident. 
270 As Meyring notes, this would render the effect limb completely otiose “because practices that are not 
even capable of having anticompetitive effects will not produce such effects in any event—and all other 
restrictions would be restrictions by object.” Bernd Meyring, T-Mobile: Further Confusion on 
Information Exchanges Between Competitors Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] 
ECR 0000, 1 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. PRAC. 30, 31 (2010). 
271 Id. at 32 (“Whereas the Court’s John Deere judgment had used a checklist approach to analyse the 
effects of an information exchange between competitors, the Maritime Transport Guidelines and the 
cases on AC Nielsen in Finland, Norway, and Sweden have moved to a more economic approach to 
effects. The ECJ’s judgment in T-Mobile Netherlands should not be misinterpreted as advocating a 
simplistic per se approach to such cases. Rather, it makes clear that an information exchange that is 
ancillary to a cartel must be treated together with the cartel and as a per se violation. The Court could 
have stated this more clearly.”). See also Cartes Bancaires, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0067 ¶ 58 
(“[T]he General Court erred in finding . . . that the concept of restriction of competition by ‘object’ must 
not be interpreted ‘restrictively.’ The concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ can be applied 
only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to 
competition that it may be found that there is no need to examine their effects, otherwise the Commission 
would be exempted from the obligation to prove the actual effects on the market of agreements which 
are in no way established to be, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal 
competition.”). 
272 Dole Food, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0286. 
273 Id. ¶ 14. 
274 Id. ¶ 13 (noting that actual prices would be a result of subsequent negotiations between the parties and 
downstream retailers or distributors, but also that quotation prices could have been used in calculating 
actual prices). 
275 Id. ¶ 102. 
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actual prices, and so would not constitute restrictions of competition by object.276 On 
appeal, the CJEU rejected this argument. Citing T-Mobile with approval, the CJEU 
upheld the EC’s finding that the employees’ conduct “made it possible to reduce 
uncertainty for each of the participants as to the foreseeable conduct of competitors,”277 
and therefore amounted to a restriction of competition by object.  
The CJEU’s holding is of particular concern given the factual matrix of Bananas, 
and the criticisms of T-Mobile are especially apposite here. In T-Mobile, it had been 
suggested that the aim of information exchange amongst the network providers was to 
determine the appropriate future levels of remuneration.278 In other words, the levels of 
remuneration were not unilaterally set and then exchanged—they were discussed, 
implying that the aim of the conversations was to reach a consensus on the 
aforementioned levels. Given the high probability of actual economic harm resulting 
from the information exchange in T-Mobile, it is difficult to disagree with the ultimate 
finding of the CJEU with regard to the firms’ liability.279 The same cannot be said for 
Bananas where the chain of causation with regard to actual economic harm was far 
more remote. As stated earlier, the pre-pricing communications were made in relation 
to hypothetical quotations by employees far removed from the actual pricing process.280 
Nevertheless, the EC imposed a fine of €60.3 million on the participants for the 
infringement.281 
As mentioned above, categorical, bright-line rules also purport to reduce 
administrative costs, such as the litigation costs incurred by enforcement agencies and 
litigants. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the characterization of certain 
instances of information exchange as object-type infringements has led to significant 
administrative cost savings. As Lemley and Leslie point out, ill-defined categories 
could lead to both error costs and regulatory costs—the “worst of both worlds.”282 
Indeed, EU litigation on information exchanges remains protracted and tedious for such 
object-type cases. The CJEUs final decision in Bananas was handed down in March 
2015, ten years after one of the cartel participants had first applied for whistleblower 
leniency in April 2005,283 and six and a half years after the EC’s infringement decision 
in October 2008.284 To be sure, the extended time taken in Bananas may be partly 
 
276 Id. ¶ 106 (noting the Dole companies’ argument that “as those communications concerned quotation 
price trends, they were not capable of removing uncertainty as to actual prices”). 
277 Id. ¶ 134. 
278 Advocate-General Kokott sets out in her opinion that the discussions indeed resulted in a coordination 
of market conduct. See T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. (Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott) ¶ 36. 
279 To clarify, we are satisfied with the ultimate incidence of liability in T-Mobile Netherlands. However, 
we disagree with the reasoning adopted by the CJEU in the determination of such liability. 
280 The inter-firm communications in question have been described, albeit outside an academic context, 
as “little more than the gossip of irrelevant employees with regard to quotations far removed from actual 
prices.” See Alfonso Lamadrid, Bananas – Case C-286/13 P, Dole v Commission, Chillin’ Competition 
Blog (Apr 28, 2015), https://chillingcompetition.com/2015/04/28/bananas-case-c-28613-p-dole-v-
commission/. 
281 See Dole Food, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0286 ¶ 28 (setting out the two fines imposed by the 
EC amounting to €45.6 million and €14.7 million respectively). 
282 Lemley & Leslie, supra note 206, at 1263. 
283 Dole Food, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0286 ¶ 4. 
284 Id. ¶ 7. Indeed, this provides another source of predictability costs. See STEFAN VOIGT & ANDRÉ 
SCHMIDT, MAKING EUROPEAN MERGER POLICY MORE PREDICTABLE 3 (2005) (“Legal certainty also has 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3498616
Vol. 57 / American Business Law Journal 
 
 44 
attributed to factors other than the intensity of evidentiary review, since a larger price-
coordination cartel was alleged in the case. Nevertheless, the issue of whether the 
information exchange should have been characterized as evidence of that price-
coordination cartel or as a stand-alone, object-type infringement was litigated in every 
stage of the proceedings, 285  notwithstanding AG Stix-Hackl’s explanation of the 
distinction between the two in her opinion in Thyssen.286  
Differences in the levels of private enforcement287 across the EU and U.S. 
antitrust regimes further highlight how any administrative cost savings in the EU 
regime are likely to be limited. As Crane points out, the cost advantages of 
undifferentiated rules over differentiated standards are far more apparent in private 
enforcement as compared to public enforcement.288 Since private parties tend to lack 
the institutional competence, financial means, and legislative powers needed to conduct 
fact-intensive inquiries, they are unlikely to initiate proceedings unless they perceive a 
high probability of a successful outcome—a perception that is less likely to arise under 
 
a time dimension. For entrepreneurial action in general and for mergers in particular, timing is often 
crucial. It is therefore not only important to get the right decision at all but to get it in time.”). 
285 The European Commission’s original decision explicitly stated that the Commission “does not find 
that the exchange of quotation prices between the parties after these prices had been set in itself gives 
rise to a distinct infringement of [the predecessor to Art 101(1) TFEU]. Rather, . . . the exchange of 
quotation prices enabled them to monitor the individual parties' quotation pricing decisions in the light 
of pre-pricing communications which took place between parties beforehand.” EC Commission Decision 
of 15.10.2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/39188 - Bananas), 
C(2008) 5955 (2008) ¶ 273. On appeal to the General Court, the firms argued that the Commission had 
wrongly distinguished between pre-pricing and ex post communications. The General Court rejected this, 
holding that “for the Commission, those exchanges of quotation prices . . . did not . . . constitute a separate 
infringement, but a mechanism for monitoring the outcome that contributed to the [cartel arrangements].” 
Dole Food, 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX 62008TJ0588 ¶ 76. But on further appeal to the ECJ, the firms again 
argued that the information exchange in itself could not constitute an object-type infringement. This time, 
the ECJ did not clarify that the information exchange was but a means of monitoring the cartel. Instead, 
the ECJ recited principles from case law (such as T-Mobile) that centered on stand-alone information 
exchanges, and ultimately held it “permissible for the [courts below] to conclude that . . . the pre-pricing 
communications had the object of creating conditions of competition that do not correspond to the normal 
conditions on the market and therefore gave rise to a concerted practice having as its object the restriction 
of competition.” Dole Food, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0286 ¶ 105–34. 
286 This is explained in Part I.D.2.  
287 Private parties have standing to sue in antitrust proceedings where they are harmed by the anti-
competitive activity. For example, a downstream distributor who suffers harm caused by an upstream 
manufacturer cartel has a private right of action to sue the cartel members for that harm. See § 15 U.S.C. 
§ 26. In the European Union, private rights of action are provided for by national competition laws 
enacted by member states. See generally Georg Berrisch et al., E.U. Competition and Private Actions for 
Damages, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 585 (2004). 
288 Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 99–
101 (2006) (“Rules have the greatest advantage in governing classes of lawsuits likely to be decided by 
juries and to result in overdeterrence due to the uncertainty of standards or strategic abuse in litigation . . . 
leav[ing] private exclusionary conduct cases to post hoc, fact specific determination . . . commits ultimate 
decision-making about economic facts to ill-equipped juries, threatens to chill vigorous competitive 
behavior, invites strategic manipulation by rent-seeking competitors, and increases the costs of antitrust 
litigation. . . . Standards are paradigmatically most appropriate to govern public enforcement seeking 
prospective relief.”). 
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a more differentiated standard.289 Thus, insofar as undifferentiated rules tend to lower 
litigation costs for private parties, we should expect undifferentiated rules to promote 
higher levels of private enforcement, ceteris paribus. 290  Despite this, “private 
enforcement has largely taken a backseat in the European Union, and enforcement by 
the EC is the norm rather than the exception.”291 In contrast, a large majority of antitrust 
enforcement in the United States stems from the private arena rather than from public 
agencies. While we do not dispute the fact that other factors also contribute to 
differences in private enforcement activity across the two regimes,292 it is difficult to 
see how a categorical approach towards information exchange has led to a meaningful 
reduction in administrative costs. 
Ultimately, such issues with an object-type classification of information 
exchanges under Art 101 TFEU harken back to the difficulties of defining when 
information exchanges can be said to “so likely… have negative effects” that an actual 
assessment of the effects following the information exchange can be safely “said to be 
redundant.” 293  Tellingly, in an attempt to resolve the substantial uncertainties 
concerning when information exchanges may be considered as restrictions of 
competition by object, the EC issued a set of Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines294 that 
articulate specific instances of conduct that the EC considers to be object-type 
restrictions. The Guidelines explain that exchanges of information regarding future 
strategic intentions of either price or quantity are restrictive of competition by object,295 
and they list other factors relevant to analyzing information exchanges.296  
Thus, as compared to the “capable of removing uncertainties” test from T-
Mobile, the Guidelines provide far clearer guidance as to the specific conduct that 
would constitute a restriction of competition by object. Nevertheless, unlike the CJEU 
case law, any Guidelines issued by the EC are not binding on the parties to whom they 
 
289 See id. at 99 (noting that rules “have the greatest advantage” in the context of private enforcement 
because, amongst other reasons, rules allow a “high likelihood of detection of [anticompetitive] behavior,” 
and that this applies to both exclusionary and, albeit to a lower extent, collusive conduct). 
290 To be sure, because standards are more open-ended and correlate to costlier, more extended litigation, 
a movement towards differentiated standards also creates more possibility for parties to launch abusive, 
rent-seeking litigation against competitors. Id. at 97–98. However, that standards litigation is costlier 
would also deter non-abusive claims. Further, as just mentioned, rules facilitate private detection of 
anticompetitive behavior. Thus, we argue that any increase in abusive litigation would likely be 
outweighed by a decrease in non-abusive litigation. 
291 Kenneth Khoo, Regulating the Inferential Process in Alleged Article 101 TFEU Infringements, 13 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 45, 63 (2017). 
292 Id. at 63 (“U.S. antitrust laws have been structured to incentivize private enforcement. Treble damages 
are granted to successful plaintiffs who have been injured by infringements of antitrust laws, injunctive 
relief is granted against a threatened loss or damage by a potential infringement, and successful plaintiffs 
are allowed to recover legal costs from defendants. . . . Historically, there have been many barriers to 
private litigation in the EU, and it was only in recent years that these barriers have gradually been lifted. 
Prior to the Damages Directive that was adopted in 2014, EU Legislation did not specifically address 
private rights of action—these principles only emerged from the EU case law in a piecemeal fashion, and 
led to considerable uncertainty for private litigants.”) (footnotes omitted). 
293 Cartes Bancaires, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0067 ¶ 51. 
294 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61. 
295 Id. ¶ 75. 
296 Id. ¶ 86–94. 
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are addressed.297 This problem is compounded by the fact that there are substantial 
differences between the Guidelines and the relevant case law.298 While the EC has 
attempted to advance a framework of competition enforcement that emphasizes the 
promotion of consumer welfare and economic efficiency, 299  the CJEU has often 
adopted a policy of strong adherence to established case law, which is often steeped in 
a philosophy centered around the protection of competitors and the upholding of the 
structure of competition.300  
E.  Information Exchange, the Bifurcated Approach of Art 101 TFEU and the 
Rule of Reason 
In Part I, we raised the notion that the bifurcated structure of Art 101 has led to extensive 
debate as to the appropriate role of Art 101(1) and Art 101(3). In contrast to the U.S. 
antitrust regime, the bifurcated structure of Art 101 has critical implications for the 
evaluation of firm conduct with ambiguous welfare effects. Article 2 of Regulation 
1/2003301 provides that the burden of proving the existence of an infringement of 
Article 101(1) is on the person or competition authority alleging the infringement, while 
the burden of showing that Article 101(3) is satisfied is on the firm making the claim. 
Thus, under the EU competition regime, firms that are alleged to have infringed Art 
101(1) pursuant to an anti-competitive instance of information exchange would bear 
the legal burden of proof of establishing efficiencies arising from that information 
exchange.302  
 
297 See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 288 (which sets out the binding nature of regulations, directives and 
decisions, but not “guidelines” or “recommendations”). 
298  The Guidelines also clearly distinguish between pure information exchanges and information 
exchanges tied to other horizontal cartels. This distinction is not always apparent in the CJEU’s decisions. 
Compare Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61 ¶ 56 (“Information exchange takes place in different 
contexts. There are agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, or concerted practices under 
which information is exchanged, where the main economic function lies in the exchange of information 
itself. Moreover, information exchange can be part of another type of horizontal co-operation agreement 
(for example, the parties to a production agreement share certain information on costs). The assessment 
of the latter type of information exchanges should be carried out in the context of the assessment of the 
horizontal co-operation agreement itself.”) with Dole Food, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62013CJ0286 ¶ 
105–34 (where the ECJ seemed to treat the information exchange as a stand-alone infringement when 
the lower courts had found the exchange to be but a means of monitoring a price-fixing cartel). 
299 See supra note 16 (on the “modernization” of EU competition law). 
300 See, e.g., supra note 14 (explaining Europemballage, 1973 E.C.R. 215); British Airways, 2007 E.C.R. 
2331.  
301 Implemented pursuant to Article 103 TFEU, replacing Regulation 17 of 1962 on May 1, 2004. Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Dec. 16, 2002, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1. 
302 Here we refer to a balanced approach where harms and benefits are directly squared off rather than 
the so-called structured rule of reason that mirrors the problematic Art 101 TFEU structure. Thus, our 
arguments support Kaplow’s systematic critique of the structured rule of reason. See generally Kaplow, 
Design of Legal Rules, supra note 207 (arguing that structured decision rules generally produce inferior 
final decisions, in terms of cost-benefit analysis, to unconstrained balancing approaches including when 
used in the antitrust context); Kaplow, Balanced Versus Structured Decision Procedures, supra note 207, 
at 1391–409 (applying the theoretical framework developed in the preceding article to specifically 
critique recent movements towards a three-step structured decision procedure for applying rule of reason 
analysis in U.S. antitrust cases). 
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While three proposals303 have been suggested in relation to how an alleged 
instance of anti-competitive conduct should be evaluated under Art 101(1) and Art 
101(3), none of the proposals provide satisfactory solutions to the problems described 
above. Under the two approaches more favorable to the defendant,304 for example, the 
problem of determining information exchanges that are prima facie anti-competitive 
still exists. We argued in Part II.C. that this is not a tenable position because it would 
have rendered the object limb and Art 101(3) completely otiose.305 Furthermore, such 
an approach goes against existing CJEU jurisprudence.306 These objections also apply 
to any argument proposing that all information exchanges be regulated under the effects 
limb of Art 101(1). 
The problem with the bifurcated regime of the EU competition regime lies with 
its inflexibility. In the U.S. antitrust regime, the courts and antitrust authorities are able 
to tailor the intensity of evidentiary evaluation in relation to the type of conduct at hand. 
Thus, for categories of conduct that have inherently ambiguous welfare effects, U.S. 
courts have been able to determine that the rule of reason is the appropriate evidentiary 
standard to evaluate such conduct. 307  In contrast, the EU competition regime 
straitjackets all facilitating practices under the framework of Art 101. In particular, Art 
101(1) requires the classification of all facilitating practices as either the object or effect 
 
303 See supra Part I.A.2. 
304 We refer to the second and third approaches. Under the second approach, a more detailed analysis is 
conducted to determine whether an agreement restricts competition under Art 101(1), while the scope of 
Art 101(3) is limited to exempt agreements that are prima facie anti-competitive agreements but 
nevertheless have demonstrable policy benefits. The third approach associates categorical forms of 
efficiency with the two limbs. For example, Art 101(1) could be concerned with allocative efficiency 
related to deadweight losses arising from restrictions of output, while Art 101(3) could be limited to 
issues of productive and dynamic efficiency independent of allocative efficiency concern. 
305 See supra note 25. As Kaplow points out, one way for a structured decision process (like the TFEU) 
to guarantee accuracy, in the sense of only prohibiting conduct where harm outweighs benefit, is to render 
the analysis at the benefits stage otiose by settling the required threshold at the harms stage strictly higher 
than the required threshold at the benefits stage. However, rendering the benefits stage pointless is 
something which the CJEU would probably not accept given its interpretative constraints. See Kaplow, 
Design of Legal Rules, supra note 207, at 1001 (“[S]uppose that [the required threshold for harm exceeds 
the required threshold for benefits]. Then this problem [of inaccurate classification] cannot 
arise…precisely because [the benefits analysis] is rendered redundant in the following sense: If, after 
step 1, we had gone straight to balancing, we would have assigned liability only when [the harm from 
the conduct exceeds its benefits]. But we already know from step 1 that [the harm from the conduct 
exceeds the required threshold], and we are assuming that our protocol sets [a higher threshold for harm 
than benefits], which implies that, as we leave step 1, we know that [the harm from the conduct exceeds 
the benefits threshold]. It is pointless to ask first whether [the benefit from the conduct] is at least as high 
as [the benefits threshold] when, if it is, we will then immediately ask whether it is at least as high as [the 
harm from the conduct], a more demanding test.”). 
306 E.g., T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529. The first approach is even more unsatisfactory. 
Under the first approach, the firm is expected to bear the burden of proof in establishing efficiencies 
despite engaging in information exchanges that may be (in actual fact) highly pro-competitive. Given the 
intrinsic difficulties associated with discharging the burden under Art 101(3), it is likely that many such 
pro-competitive exchanges would be incorrectly held as anti-competitive. 
307 This is true not only for categories of conduct relating to facilitating practices, but also for vertical 
agreements. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (where the Supreme 
Court held that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason). 
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limb. 308  However, underlying Art 101 is the assumption that certain practices are 
inherently injurious to competition.309 Such assumptions may simply be untenable as a 
matter of fact in accordance with prevailing economic theory and our understanding of 
the empirical evidence in support of those assumptions. 
Art 101 also assumes that the defendant firm is better placed to establish 
quantifiable efficiencies arising from its own conduct.310 While this may be true in 
relation to certain forms of efficiencies (such as productive efficiencies arising from 
synergistic mergers), it may be close to impossible in relation to other forms of pro-
competitive efficiencies, many of which arise in conduct alleged to be facilitating 
practices. For instance, how would a firm be able to establish efficiencies in the 
reduction of consumer search costs? Unlike the estimation of potential cost reductions, 
the search costs of consumers are unobserved by the firm in question. The fact that the 
benefits arising from information exchanges are independent from their costs 
compounds the problem, as the defendant firm is required to invoke Art 101(3)311 to 
defend an alleged instance of information exchange that simultaneously ameliorates 
collusion while also improving allocative efficiency.312 As the defendant firm’s burden 
of proof under Art 101(3) goes beyond the establishment of pro-competitive 
efficiencies, and requires the firm to show, inter alia, that the conduct would not lead 
to an elimination of competition in the market,313 it is hence likely that many such pro-
competitive exchanges would be incorrectly held as anti-competitive. 
We have argued in Part II above that the prophylactic nature of a rule prohibiting 
certain forms of information exchange makes the relevant analysis similar to that 
conducted in a merger regulation setting—the extent to which an instance of 
 
308 Jones makes a similar point in relation to firms having to contort efficiency arguments to fulfill the 
rubric of Art 101(3). See Jones, supra note 229, at 652 (“Eventually the Commission did embark on a 
journey toward the reform advocated, seeking to deal with the central problem that too many agreements 
were being sucked into Article 101(1) and then forced into straitjackets in order to satisfy the conditions 
of Article 101(3).”). 
309 Pursuant to both the object/effect distinction provided in Art 101(1) and the bifurcated structure of 
the legislation, with the firm having an onerous burden of proof under Art 101(3). 
310 This is because efficiencies are only considered under Art 101(3) and the defendant firm has the 
burden to prove the defense in Art 101(3). We described this in more detail in Part I. 
311 Invoking Art 101(3) in every instance where the firm is better placed to adduce evidence also subverts 
the presumption of innocence. However, such considerations are beyond the scope of this article. See 
generally Marco Bronckers & Anne Vallery, No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental 
Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law, 34 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 535 (2011) 
(arguing that certain administrative presumptions in EU competition law conflict with the fundamental 
presumption of innocence). 
312 Beyond the detrimental effects on welfare through the amelioration of a collusive equilibrium. 
313 As Jones argues, the burden of proof that the firm has to discharge under the “net economic benefit” 
exception is non-trivial and requires proof of a series of onerous requirements—including (i) 
substantiated efficiencies by showing the nature of the claimed efficiencies, the link between the 
agreement and the efficiencies, the likelihood and magnitude of each claimed efficiency, and how and 
when each claimed efficiency would be achieved; (ii) that the restrictive agreement as such is reasonably 
necessary in order to achieve the efficiencies and that the individual restrictions of competition that flow 
from the agreement are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies; and (iii) that the 
agreement as a whole must not lead to the elimination of competition. Indeed, the difficulty of 
discharging the burden of proof in an overtly formalistic regime will not result in a substantial 
amelioration of false positives or Type I errors (wrongful condemnations). Jones, supra note 229, at 669–
70. 
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information exchange affects competition depends on how difficult coordination would 
be absent the exchange. The appropriate inquiry to be conducted here is thus very much 
analogous to a coordinated effects analysis within merger control,314 where a reduction 
in uncertainty facing a firm is evaluated in the context of the structure of the market in 
question and the characteristics of the information exchanged. This can take place even 
in the absence of robust econometric analysis.315 Indeed, the adoption of a U.S. style 
rule of reason approach towards all instances of information exchanges does not 
envisage a rigorous bar that may prove close to impossible for the plaintiff to discharge. 
Rather, as opposed to the use of formalistic presumptions, we emphasize the normative 
desirability of using context-specific rules to evaluate information exchanges. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have attempted to characterize the prophylactic nature of the antitrust 
rules prohibiting stand-alone instances of information exchange in both EU and U.S. 
antitrust law. Given the nature of such rules, we have argued that Art 101 TFEU is 
particularly problematic. In particular, the quasi-per se nature of the EU competition 
regime’s treatment of such information exchanges may lead to significant wrongful 
convictions, a major cause of economic inefficiency. We have also argued that the 
increase in error costs following from such formalism is likely to outweigh any 
countervailing decrease in administrative costs. Thus, for a jurisdiction considering an 
appropriate framework to establish generic competition laws, there are good reasons to 
adopt a U.S. style rule of reason approach toward all instances of information exchange. 
Given the convergence in the objectives of U.S. and EU competition policy, the 
considerable divergence in antitrust enforcement that remains is worthy of attention. 
As a majority of competition regimes in jurisdictions around the world resemble EU 
competition laws more closely than U.S. antitrust laws, this article also aims to promote 
a more critical application of foreign decisions in the local context. In particular, we 
highlight an instance of how overly formalistic rules may be inefficient, subverting the 






314 This is a similarity which the EC’s Guidelines also note. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 61, ¶ 
21 (“The analysis of horizontal co-operation agreements has certain common elements with the analysis 
of horizontal mergers pertaining to the potential restrictive effects.”). See also Case C-413/06 P, 
Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v. Independent Music Publishers and Labels Ass’c. 
(Impala), 2008 E.C.R. I–4951 ¶ 122–23 (noting that a collective dominant position is more likely to 
tacitly arise between horizontal competitors when firms resort to collusive beahviour to adopted common 
market policies); Case T-342/99, Airtours v Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. II–1785 ¶ 62 (“[E]ach member of the 
dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know how the other members are behaving in order to 
monitor whether or not they are adopting the common policy.”).  
315 See generally Gregory J. Werden, Product Differentiation: Simulating the Effects of Differentiated 
Products Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363 
(1997). Although new techniques are currently being developed, few econometric methods seem able to 
consistently estimate the magnitude of coordinated effects between merging parties and their rivals. 
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